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Few regularly recurring problems are more agonizing to cor-
porate managers and their legal advisors than those involving se-
curities law disclosure requirements. The so-called materiality
standard for screening out what must be disclosed is of little aid.
Material information can be described accurately only as a tautol-
ogy: the SEC's and the courts' views from time to time of what
they believe investors believe is important.'
The murkiness of the materiality standard is surpassed only
by the practical problems of monitoring the mass of unarticulated
data available for most businesses to determine which items of
information are candidates for inclusion under the materiality
concept. Moreover, it is nearly impossible for a manager con-
stantly to keep disclosure obligations at the forefront of his mind,
given the equally pressing demands to comply with a great vol-
ume of government regulations with respect to safety, employ-
ment relations, taxes, retirement benefits, anti-trust, consumer
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. Research for this Article was sup-
ported in part by the Council on Research and Creative Work of the University of
Colorado.
1. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977).
[S]ince the importance of a particular piece of information depends on
the context in which it is given, materiality has become one of the most
unpredictable and elusive concepts of the federal securities laws. The
SEC itself has despaired of providing written guidelines to advise wary
corporate management of the distinctions between material and non-
material information, and instead has chosen to rely on an after-the-
fact, case-by-case approach, seeking injunctive relief when it believes
that the appropriate boundaries have been breached.
Id. at 10; cf. Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW.
887, 892 (1977) (materiality suffers from problems of definition and attempts to define
the term are generally circular).
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protection, and other areas, to say nothing of his manufacturing,
marketing, and financing responsibilities.
That courts are quite willing to second-guess disclosure deci-
sions after a plaintiffs attorney artificially focuses the spotlight of
attention on the particular failure of disclosure serves to increase
the pain. Managers cannot sleep nights knowing that once a da-
tum has been so isolated, plaintiffs, their lawyers, and some courts
and juries will confuse relevance and materiality; that is, they tend
to consider as appropriate for disclosure any datum which might
be relevant to some investor, no matter how relatively insignifi-
cant it may be in the overall picture. 2
Securities lawyers, appreciative of all this, have sought to de-
velop particularized rules and procedures to lessen the uncertainty
of disclosure requirements and to formulate feasible disclosure
practices. This task now has been dramatically enlarged with a
vast new area for concern: it recently has been recognized offi-
cially that "soft information," as well as "hard," can be of great
importance to investors.3 Indeed, investment analysts consider
2. The problem is not removed by the Supreme Court's decision in TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). The Court stated that only data which
"would" be important to a reasonable investor is material. Id. at 445-49. The
"would" test is highly pliable and difficult to oversee. The Court also adopted the
"buried facts" doctrine, to the effect that disclosure is inadequate when a material
datum is buried in a mass of data. Id. at 448-49. The courts seem unable to perceive
that a corollary to the buried facts doctrine is that once an undisclosed fact is culled
out by a plaintiff's lawyer and placed in prominence, it acquires an undue aura of
importance. The courts instead should see that when managers view a mass of data
when considering disclosure, the particular datum at issue may be so buried as not to
command sufficient attention to indicate the need to disclose. See also Hewitt, supra
note 1, at 892.
3. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
95TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE Dis-
CLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 344-79 (Comm. Print
1977) [hereinafter cited as REPORT], abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,357. Soft information includes forecasts of earnings, reve-
nues, and other financial data; budgets for capital expenditures; future dividend pol-
icy; management analyses of financial statements; or any other forward-looking or
even past, but subjectively determined, information concerning prospects of a com-
pany for investment use. In contrast, historical and objectively verifiable information
is sometimes termed "hard information." Id. at 347. See also Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972) (soft
information includes "future earnings, appraised asset valuations and other hypothet-
ical data"). In fact there is no clear delineation between hard and soft data. It has
been said that, "[many apparently hard statements have soft cores and vice versa."
Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254,
256 (1972). Schneider offered an explanation of the term:
Although a comprehensive definition of soft information is not readily
apparent, several non-exclusive and non-exhaustive categories can be
identified: (1) forward-looking statements concerning the future, such
as projections, forecasts, predictions, and statements concerning plans
and expectations; (2) statements concerning past or present situations
when the maker of the statement lacks the data necessary to prove its
[Vol. 26:95
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projections, one type of soft data, to be at the heart of the body of
information important for their tasks.4 Other soft data such as the
firm's estimated market share are also important to investors, as
are capital budgets and the like.
Traditionally, SEC practices and procedures had prohibited
the publication of most soft information in SEC-filed documents,
although informal dissemination in press releases and other publi-
cations exogenous to SEC filings always has been common.5 The
basic concerns of the SEC have been that allowing soft informa-
tion in filed documents could diminish the reputation of SEC doc-
uments as strictly "factual" and increase the potential for
deception of investors who, it is feared, might place undue
credence in such data.6 However, recent years have seen the re-
moval of restrictions on some soft information and the inclusion
of other soft data in the mandatory disclosure scheme. For exam-
ple, projections of earnings and revenues and certain appraisal in-
formation are permitted, while management analyses of
summaries of financial data are required in registration statements
and some other filings.
7
accuracy-for example, information on a company's historical share of
the market, when it does not have access to precise statistics concerning
its competitors; (3) information based primarily on subjective evalua-
tions-for example, representations concerning the competence or in-
tegrity of management, the relative efficiency of a manufacturing
operation, or the appraised value of assets; (4) statements of motive,
purpose, or intention, since it is frequently easier to verify objectively
what was done than to determine why it was done-for example, expla-
nation of the reasons for which an auditor has been discharged; (5)
statements involving qualifying words, such as "excellent," "inge-
nious," "efficient" and "imaginative," for which there are no generally
accepted objective standards of measurement in most contexts.
Id. at 255.
4. See, e.g., Mann, Prospectuses.- Unreadable or Just Unread? A Proposal to Re-
examine Policies Against Permitting Projections, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 222, 224
(1971).
5. See note 75 & accompanying text infra.
6. It has been the Commission's long-standing policy not to permit
projections and predictions in prospectuses and reports filed with the
Commission. Such documents are designed to elicit material facts.
Their factual character is widely recognized. Investors and their advi-
sors are at liberty to make their own projections based on the disclo-
sures resulting from the Commission's requirements. A real danger
exists, in the Study's judgment, that projections appearing in prospec-
tuses and other documents filed under the securities laws and reviewed
by the Commission would be accorded a greater measure of validity by
the unsophisticated than they would deserve.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, A REAP-
PRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 96
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Wheat Report). See also Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973).
7. Projections of earnings, revenues, and other financial items concerning future
performance are now permitted although the Commission points out that it is
"neither encouraging nor discouraging" them. Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976
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The SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure in its
Report8 applauds this recent change of policy, recommends fur-
ther experimentation, and proposes a "safe harbor" rule to en-
courage companies to make disclosures of soft information. The
Committee has singled out certain categories of soft data as merit-
ing special attention by the Commission, including permissive dis-
closure of management's forecasts of sales and earnings, capital
expenditures budgets, plans and objectives, dividend policy, and
capital structure policies as well as alteration of the already
mandatory management analysis of financial statements.9 Since
publication of the Report, the SEC has instructed its staff to con-
sider modes of implementing the Advisory Committee's recom-
mendations on soft information.10
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 80,461, at 86,201. Management analyses
of summaries of financial data are required in most 1933 and 1934 Act registration
statements, other filings, and annual reports to shareholders. See Guide No. 22 for
Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, Sec. Act Release No. 4936, [1975]
1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 3782 [hereinafter cited as Guide 22]; Guide No. 1 for
Preparation and Filing of Reports and Registration Statements under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 10,961, [1977] 2 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 23,060 [hereinafter cited as Guide 1]. Additional soft information appears in
SEC filings in several other ways: intended application of the proceeds of the offer-
ing, e.g., Form S-I, Item 3, [1974] 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7123; professed com-
petence of certain directors and officers, Form S-1, Item 16, [1978] 2 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 7123; risk factors, Guide No. 5 for Preparation and Filing of Registra-
tion Statement, Sec.Act Release No. 5396, [1973] 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 3765;
Guide No. 6 for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, Sec. Act Release
No. 5278, [19731 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 3766; Guide No. 59(d) for Preparation
and Filing of Registration Statements, Sec. Act Release No. 5396, [1976] 1 FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 3819; compensating balance arrangements, Regulation S-X, 17
C.F.R. § 210.5-02.1 (1977); unusual financial risks and uncertainties, SEC Acctg. Se-
ries Release No. 166, [1977] 4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,188; Form 10-Q, Instruc-
tion J, [1978] 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 31,031; estimated replacement cost data,
Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17 (1977); projections in real estate offerings, Form
S- 1l, Item 6, [1976] 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 7234. In registered tender offers,
plans and proposals of the offeror company must be disclosed, Schedule 14D, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1977), and disclosure of plans and proposals would also be
required under the current proposals for "going private" transactions, Proposed
Schedule 13E-3, [1977] 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 23,706; and the regulations
adopted for issuer's purchases of their own shares, Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d-101 (1977). In 1972, the "hot issues" releases also required much soft data of
a negative nature for immature companies. See Sec. Act Release No. 5395, [1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 79,383; Sec. Act Release No. 5396, [1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,384. Because of the liabilities which
might accrue, especially for misleading statements in registration statements under §
I I of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), few issuers have been interested in putting
soft information in filed documents. The high degree of subjectivity and risk of mis-
estimates entail a high risk of litigation, if not liability. See Schneider, supra note 3,
at 254, 257.
8. REPORT, note 3 supra.
9. See notes 26-61 & accompanying text infra.
10. Sec. Act Release No. 5906, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 81,505.
SOFT INFORMATION
Interestingly, despite dissents from members of the Advisory
Committee on other aspects of the Report, there is virtual unanim-
ity on the recommendations concerning soft information. Perhaps
this is due in part to the fact that most of the soft information
disclosure recommendations call for voluntary, permissive disclo-
sure while much of the disagreement in the Committee centered
on the expressed conclusion that a mandatory system is appropri-
ate for hard (as well as some soft) disclosures, as at present."
This Article sets forth: (a) the conventional wisdom, right or
wrong, concerning why soft information is considered relevant to
investment decision making, (b) a description in greater detail of
the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, which are
based on this conventional wisdom, and (c) a discussion of some
special problems of liability for misrepresentation which will have
a bearing on issuers' decisions whether voluntarily to disclose
more soft data, a course which the Advisory Committee urges the
SEC to encourage issuers to follow.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESS
Rational investors selecting from among securities, whether
corporate stocks or bonds, real estate, commodity options, savings
accounts or any of a myriad of others,12 calculate how their wealth
may be maximized by selection among the alternatives available.
Traditionally, the basic investment technique has been to deter-
mine an amount to be invested and then to purchase the security
expected to yield the highest return 13 for the desired degree of
risk.
14
The process can be analyzed with slightly more refinement.
It may be said that the investor's purpose is to maximize his
wealth, which can be calculated by determining the present value
of the stream of expected future income.' 5 Thus, if an individual
11. See notes 27-30 & accompanying text infra.
12. In the terminology of economists, a "security" is defined far more broadly
than under the securities laws, including any income-earning asset whether com-
monly known as a security or real estate or something else. See W. SHARPE, PORTFO-
LIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 19 (1970) (defining security as a "decision
affecting the future").
13. There has been a running dispute as to whether "return" means enterprise
earnings or the dividends and gain or loss on resale by the investor. See V. BRUDNEY
& M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 419-46 (1972). These two are actually
equivalents when properly adjusted, basically because earnings of the enterprise ulti-
mately result in dividends or are reflected in resale prices of the securities. See Miller
& Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411
(1961).
14. Risk is defined as the chance that the actual return on an investment is likely
to diverge from the expected return. W. SHARPE, supra note 12, at 25-26.
15. See note 18 & accompanying text infra (calculation of present value).
1978]
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is convinced that there is no value to the future income, as he will
be if the world is to end tomorrow, most likely he will consume
today whatever he can to the extent he pleases.' 6 Under less unu-
sual conditions, the near future is more likely to be attained and
the investor has a choice between consumption now and probable
consumption later. In this situation, he may be able to increase
his total wealth by wise investment.
What does it mean, to increase wealth, and how does one
make wise decisions on how to invest?
A. The Traditional Model of Investment Decision Making
The traditional technique of investment decision making is
cogently explained by Professor William Sharpe.17 As Sharpe
suggests, the initial investment choice is between consumption
now and consumption at a later time. The psychological fact that
most people are willing to sacrifice a greater amount of future
consumption for a lesser amount of present consumption explains
their willingness to pay interest for borrowings. Similarly, be-
cause the lender prefers present consumption, he demands interest
on loans.
If an investor has $100 at the beginning of this year, he might
consume it all now, save it all for later, or consume some now and
some later. That which he does not consume may be invested and
earn interest. If the investment is riskless, the amount paid by the
investee is merely the negotiated amount that he is willing to pay
for the present enjoyment and which the investor is willing to ac-
cept for deferral of enjoyment. This is often referred to as the
"pure" interest rate.
On the assumptions that the investor could borrow at the
pure interest rate and that he will receive that rate for any de-
ferred receipts, the pattern of receipts is irrelevant. The cash, if
received at the beginning, may be banked at the pure rate. If the
$100 plus interest is received at any later time, even in install-
ments, the investor may borrow at the pure rate for earlier con-
sumption. Thus, at the outset he could have $100 cash
immediately available for consumption. Conversely, in the sec-
ond year, he instead could have $107 available for consumption.
In any case, his wealth is the same-$-100 at present value.
Sharpe uses a simple graph to illustrate his points. In Figure
1 below, note that present and future consumption may be deter-
mined at any point along the x-w line if our subject's present
wealth is $100 and if the interest rate is seven percent:
16. Cf. Isaiah 22:13 ("Let us eat and drink; for tomorrow we shall die").
17. W. SHARPE, supra note 12, at 7-17.
[Vol. 26:95
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If the individual consumes the entire $100 this year, he will
have nothing for next year, and his two-year pattern of consump-
tion will be plotted at point w. If he consumes nothing this year,
he may consume $107 next (point x). Similarly, he may choose
any point along the x-w line, for example, $60 this year and
$42.80 next (pointy).
Further, if the individual finds an investment that returns
more than the pure interest rate, he may increase his overall
wealth and consumption. Thus, if he is able to invest $20 this year
in return for an investment cash flow of $32.10 next year, he could
consume $40 this year and $42.80 plus $32.10, or $74.90 next
(point z), a present value (discounted at seven percent) of
$110-an increase of $10 in present value of wealth.18 By also
18. Or he could consume $60 this year, invest the $20 in the highly profitable
security to receive $32.10 and get seven percent on the remaining $20 of the $100. He
will then be able to consume $53.50 next year. The present value, discounted at seven
percent will still be $110, composed of the $60 consumed, the $32.10 discounted at
seven percent (to $30) and the $20 invested at seven percent. This description of the
latter two amounts also explains the concept of present value: the $20, to be invested
at seven percent, manifestly has a value at present of $20 if we assume seven percent
as the standard of price to be paid for deferral of enjoyment. Applying the same stan-
dard of seven percent, we can determine that $32.10 received next year is equivalent to
$30 invested at seven percent. Thus although the cost of that investment is $20, its
1978]
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borrowing or lending in year one (at seven percent), he may con-
sume at any point along the a-b line. Hence, it is desirable that
one invest at a higher rate of return than the pure interest rate. By
the same reasoning, if the return on the putative investment would
be less than seven percent, his total two-year satisfaction will be
greater if he consumes in year one or saves at the seven percent
rate instead of investing at the lesser rate.
The next question, how to choose among alternative invest-
ments, would be no problem if no risk were involved: all would
choose the investment paying the highest rate of return.19 Of
course, other factors being equal, if there is no risk, no investee
would have to pay more than the pure interest rate. There is risk,
however, and the return on risky investments therefore must ex-
ceed the pure interest rate to be attractive.20 We see, then, that
return may be thought of as consisting of two elements-the pure
interest rate, as for a riskless loan, and the additional return for
carrying the particular risk.2' Hence, the problem of selecting
among securities basically has been reduced to weighing the re-
turns against the risks and comparing results among different se-
curities.
B. Relevance of the Traditional Investment Decision Model to
Securities Law
It is clear why an investor is interested in data concerning risk
and return. If he can determine his probable return on an invest-
ment and the risk that his actual return will vary from this proba-
ble return, then he will be able to determine what portion of his
income he should invest in particular securities, thereby maximiz-
ing his wealth at the desired risk level. The analysis of risk and
Palue, assuming a sevenpercent discount rate for measuring values, is $30. See also A.
ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 201-09 (2d ed. 1967).
19. This is not entirely accurate. Some investments may be more or less attrac-
tive depending on such factors as "snob appeal." Thus, Rolls Royce shares were at-
tractive to some investors even when the company appeared bankrupt, and some of
the attraction was probably due to factors other than risk and return. Also, in this era
of social consciousness, at least a few investors may be motivated otherwise than by
profitability, at least in part. Moreover, often members of the family of the founder of
a company will prefer that company's securities, often without regard to risk or re-
turn.
20. Return, of course, is a function of price. What is meant here is that if an
owner of a security wishes to sell it, he must fix his price at an amount which will
yield a return sufficient to attract an investor at the assumed risk level.
21. Risk determination is a highly imprecise matter, and the nature of risk varies
among securities. However, micro-economic theory in recent decades has provided a
practical basis for quantifying the determination of risk, thereby facilitating compari-
son of securities. Instead of being an unarticulated rough approximation, it has be-
come an articulated rough approximation. See J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE
STOCK MARKET, THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 123 (1973).
[Vol. 26:95
SOFT INFORMATION
return for individual companies is termed "fundamental analy-
sis. "22
Information about a firm's projected earnings will have a di-
rect bearing on the estimation of return for investors in its securi-
ties, which in turn relates directly to present value.
23
Thus, in our example, the estimate that the $20 investment
would yield the $32.10 future return enables a determination that
the present value was really $30, not $20. The projection of $32. 10
(if reliable) is much more relevant than the historical data that last
year the same security earned $15. Similarly, soft information
bearing on risk (for example, reliance of the firm on one large
customer) seems highly relevant to investors. In a word, much
soft information is important to fundamental analysis where de-
terminations are made of expected future cash flow and of the risk
that the flow will be other than that expected. Given the fact that
traditional investment analysis has been fundamental analysis, the
materiality of soft as well as hard information to investment deci-
sion making is evident.
24
From the beginning, the SEC has embraced fundamental
analysis through its mandates for disclosure of company-
originated data.25 Hence, the Commission, realizing the great rel-
22. Fundamental analysis involves the analysis of financial statements of a com-
pany plus other available data in an effort to find and purchase undervalued securities
or to determine overvalued securities in an investor's portfolio which should be sold.
The bible of fundamental analysis is B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURITY
ANALYSIS (4th ed. 1962). Since a portion of risk may be eliminated through diversifi-
cation of investments, it is not appropriate to study individual securities without con-
sideration of the investor's entire portfolio. This fact forms one basis for modem
"portfolio theory." Another basis is the "efficient market hypothesis" which posits
that in an efficient market, it is not possible to find underpriced or overpriced securi-
ties through analyses of public information. A third basis is a method for determining
appropriate investments by ascertaining risks for the portfolio and matching risk pref-
erences of the investor. See J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, note 21 supra; W. SHARPE,
note 12 supra.
23. See Miller & Modigliani, note 13 supra. See also Sprouse, The Importance of
Earnings in the Conceptual Framework, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Jan. 1978, at 64, 67. Ana-
lysts believe projections to be at the heart of their task. N.Y. Soc. OF SEC. ANALYSTS,
ANALYST'S GUIDE TO CORPORATE RELATIONS 4 (Summer 1969), cited in Mann,
supra note 4, at 227.
24. There is another traditional school of investment analysis which depends on
historical patterns of prices for the particular security-termed "technical analysis."
Technical analysts, or "chartists," have numerous techniques for extrapolating from
charts of past prices which they claim enable them to find underpriced or overpriced
securities.
25. The information is required in 1933 Act registration statements, periodic re-
ports, proxy solicitations, and otherwise. Registration is required by § 5 of the 1933
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). Periodic reports of companies registered under § 12 of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976), or of companies which had filed a 1933 Act
registration statement on a public offering, are required by §§ 13 and 15(d) of the
1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1976). Proxy regulations have been adopted
pursuant to § 14 of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
19781
UCLA LAW REVIEW
evance of much soft information for fundamental analysis, would
doubtless long ago have permitted, if not required, soft data such
as projections but for reservations concerning its reliability.
The Advisory Committee, also recognizing the great rele-
vance of much soft data to fundamental analysis, is, in addition,
willing to experiment with balancing high relevance against low
reliability. Moreover, seeing that the low reliability may lead to
investor losses, in turn inducing loss of management credibility
with investors and possible litigation, the Advisory Committee
suggests permissive disclosure of soft data and a safe harbor for
persons publishing such data.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
CONCERNING SOFT INFORMATION
Two fundamental questions have been raised concerning the
present system of SEC-mandated disclosure of company-
originated data: first, whether much of the information required
in SEC filings is of little utility to investors, while other data which
have been prohibited may be of greater utility; and second,
"whether there are presently economic and public policy justifica-
tions for the existence of a disclosure system that, at least with
respect to company-originated information, is characterized by a
strong mandatory dimension regulated by a federal agency";
26
that is, should disclosure be mandated by the SEC or instead be
permitted on a voluntary basis?
27
The Committee concluded that disclosure of more soft infor-
mation should be encouraged; and, after acknowledging that a
negative answer to the second question would lead to elimination
of the present mandatory disclosure system, 28 a radical result, a
majority placed the burden of persuasion on the critics of the pres-
ent mandatory system and found that that burden had not been
met.29 The bases for those conclusions are set forth in the intro-
duction to the Report which gave rise to a characteristically can-
did dissent by Homer Kripke, in effect stating that 'the
introduction was an afterthought.30 However, there was full con-
currence of Committee members with the Report's recommenda-
tions that the SEC encourage voluntary and permissive disclosure
of soft information.3' Hence, it appears that the one major issue
addressed by the Report to the satisfaction of the entire Advisory
26. REPORT, supra note 3, at V.
27. Id.
28. Id. at II.
29. Id. at V.
30. Id. at D-49. See also Kripke, Where Are We on Securities Disclosure After the
Advirory Committee Report?, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 99 (1978).
31. REPORT, supra note 3, at D-49.
[Vol. 26:95
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Committee was whether more soft data should be permitted, on a
voluntary basis, in SEC filings. The issues which may not have
been adequately addressed, in the opinion of some, concern the
sufficiency of benefits from mandatory disclosures.
A. What Audience Should the Disclosure System Address?
In arriving at the conclusion that disclosure of more soft data
should be encouraged, 32 the Advisory Committee attempts to lay
to rest one ghost which should never have arisen, that is, the mis-
conceived notion that SEC disclosure should be for the ordinary
person in the street-Main Street, not Wall Street.
The SEC's consistent view, until recently, had been single-
mindedly set in favor of making the disclosure system serve the
unsophisticated, 33 with the unfortunate consequence that much
information of potential value to sophisticates was prohibited on
the ground that it might mislead the naive. The view that disclo-
sure should be for the naive reached its nadir in 1972 when the
Commission required various pie-charts and other pictographs in
disclosure documents. 34 But then the Commission began to
recoup when it picked up a suggestion from the Wheat Report
32. Although the information called for in Schedules A and B of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77aa (1976), and §§ 12-14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78n (1976); 15
U.S.C.A. § 78m (West Supp. Pamph. 1977), is historical objective data, both Acts, in
these sections, grant broad authority to the Commission to require additional infor-
mation, and it is believed that there is thus ample authority for compelling soft data.
The current view of the SEC, resulting from several changes in the past several years,
already permits or mandates much soft information. See note 7 supra.
33. The Report points out manifestations of a change in this policy in the 1973
projections release, Sec. Act Release No. 5362, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 79,211; the 1974 requirement of a management analysis, Guide 22
and Guide 1, note 7 supra; the 1976 replacement cost accounting rules, SEC Acctg.
Series Release No. 190, [1977] 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 72,212; and its 1976
projections release, Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 80,461. The Report incidentally developed an additional item of
empirical evidence in support of the change. This new evidence is that individual
investors in large part are in fact not unsophisticated. REPORT, supra note 3, at 273-
74, 300-01. But see Kripke, supra note 30, at 104 (reporting that the sampling proce-
dures used make certain conclusions invalid, presumably including this one).
34. Guide No. 6 for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, Sec. Act
Release No. 5278, [1973] 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 3766; Guide No. 8 for Prepara-
tion and Filing of Registration Statements, Sec. Act Release No. 5171, [1973] 1 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 3768; Guide No. 21 for Preparation and Filing of Registration
Statements, Sec. Act Release No. 5278, [1975] 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 3781. In
the pungent rhetoric of Harold Marsh, we perceive the pent-up indignation of one
forced thus to write in SEC filings:
We now, of course, have the new offical position that not only must
prospectuses be intelligible to school children, but they must even reach
down to the kindergarten set, who have not yet graduated from finger
painting. Under the recent guide adopted by the Commission, the
drafter of the prospectus must draw pictures to inform the person look-
ing at the prospectus-one cannot say the "reader," since they assume
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that disclosure might be further developed for both the naive and
the sophisticated. 35 This "differential disclosure" concept has
been adopted in numerous ways in the present requirements of the
Commission.
36
Perhaps it was necessary for the Commission to touch bottom
before it could recover from the mistaken notion that disclosure
may or should serve the unsophisticated. In any event, the Report
now embraces the view that seems to be held by most serious stu-
dents of securities laws: that disclosure must be and should be for
sophisticates who will filter information to the masses and thereby
cause the market price to adjust efficiently to the information as
interpreted by the knowledgeable.
37
In reaching this view, the securities bar may have come full
circle, back to what arguably was the original understanding.
38
he will not or cannot read-of the percentage of the equity retained by
the promoters and the percentage being sold to the public.
New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings-A Panel Discussion, 28
Bus. LAW. 505, 528 (1973) (remarks of Harold Marsh) [hereinafter cited as Panel
Discussion].
35. Some suggested that one problem, how to insulate the naive from sophisti-
cated data which might be confusing, could be resolved by having such data filed with
the SEC but not disseminated generally in annual reports or otherwise. This differen-
tial disclosure concept was pushed in the 1970s. See Sec. Act Release No. 5427, [1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,519 (at part entitled "An Approach to
Disclosure"); Sommer, Differential Disclosure: To Each His Own, The Second An-
nual Emmanuel Saxe Distinguished Accounting Lecture, Baruch College, N.Y. (Mar.
19, 1974), abstracted in SEC News Digest 74-55 (Mar. 20, 1974).
The Wheat Report, supra note 6, at 9-10, and Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), both took the view that
disclosure must be for the "unsophisticated investor" as well as for the "knowledge-
able student of finance."
36. See Sec. Act Release No. 5427, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 79,519 (explaining differential disclosure). In Accounting Series Releases
147, 148, 149, 163, and 164, the Commission attempts to inform issuers and their
accountants as to which matters should be disclosed generally to investors and which
may be reserved for analysts, to be filed only with the SEC. [1977] 5 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 72,169-71, 72,185-86.
37. See REPORT, supra note 3, at D-9, where the Committee states that "[t]he
Commission should emphasize disclosure of information useful to reasonably knowl-
edgeable investors willing to make the effort needed to study the disclosures, leaving
to disseminators the development of simplified formats and summaries usable by less
experienced and less knowledgeable investors."
Harold Marsh said:
It seems to me that the only common sense approach to the ques-
tion of the audience to whom the disclosure should be directed is that it
should be directed to those persons who are capable of understanding
the transactions being described. . . . [Tbo attempt to explain to a per-
son who is incapable of understanding is a complete waste of time.
Panel Discussion, supra note 34, at 527 (citing Walpert v. Bart, 280 F. Supp. 1006 (D.
Md. 1969), aff'dper curiam, 390 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1968); Shvetz v. Industrial Rayon
Corp., 212 F. Supp. 308, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)).
38. The Report refers to the legislative history which indicates that 1933 Act in-
formation "is of a character comparable to that demanded by competent bankers
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This conclusion of the Report may be one of its more important
contributions to disclosure policy. The Report expresses the con-
sensus view of knowledgeable securities lawyers and should be ac-
cepted by the SEC and Congress.
This conclusion, that disclosure should be gauged for the
people who can comprehend complex financial data, has an im-
portant implication: more soft information must be supplied be-
cause sophisticates can themselves weigh its relevance against its
reliability. 3
9
B. What Soft Information Should Be, Disclosed?
What specifically did the Advisory Committee recommend
with respect to various categories of soft information?
1. Projections
The SEC, after a brief flirtation with forward-looking infor-
mation in the mid-1930s, banned projections in filed documents
and, for companies "in registration," even in non-filed disclo-
sures.4° Beginning in 1972, however, the Commission attempted
to develop a policy concerning disclosure of projections which, af-
ter some flowing and ebbing, culminated in the rather inconclu-
sive 1976 announcement which expressly permitted disclosures of
projections without encouraging or discouraging them.41 In addi-
tion to that policy statement, proposed guidelines which set forth
from their borrowers and has been worked out in light of these and other develop-
ments." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933), quoted in REPORT, supra
note 3, at 564 n. 11. See also Wheat Report, supra note 6, at 52-53, cited in REPORT,
supra note 3, at 564 n. 11; Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. (n.s.) 508,
523-24 (1933), quoted in REPORT, supra note 3, at 312-13 (where then Professor Doug-
las pointed out that sophisticates will cause the market prices of securities to reach a
level proper in the light of the disclosed information so that price will be a surrogate
for the unsophisticated).
Professor Douglas had nothing to do with drafting the 1933 Act. These authori-
ties fail to make a convincing case that the original draftsmen had in mind the market
price surrogate principle; but, in any event, the great growth since 1933 of financial
intermediaries such as mutual funds and investment advisors make the surrogate con-
cept more acceptable now.
39. In private offering circulars, which by definition are not regulated by the
SEC, and which are prepared for sophisticates, the most important data are projec-
tions. See note 82 infra.
40. Sec. Act Release No. 5180, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) T 78,192. But there were exceptions for real estate companies, projections of a
negative nature, proxy contests, and corporate combinations. REPORT, supra note 3,
at A-270.
It is not clear whether the 1976 changes described in the text below changed the
prohibition while "in registration" although the Advisory Committee believes it ar-
guably did. See REPORT supra note 3, at 360-61. See also note 75 infra.
41. Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 80,461.
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the requirements of the Division of Corporation Finance were
also announced: "(1) that management have a reasonable basis
for its projections; (2) that the projections be presented in an ap-
propriate format; and (3) that the accompanying disclosures facili-
tate investor understanding of the basis for and limitations of
projections."
42
The Report supports the trend toward more disclosure of pro-
jections and recommends that the SEC encourage publication of
analytical and forward-looking data on a voluntary basis.43 The
Report expressed the hope that, although the proposal was for
voluntary disclosure only, market forces, such as investor demand
and the firm's own interest in procuring a following by security
analysts, would induce disclosure of projections." Because the
Report views projection disclosure as experimental, it suggests
that the Commission monitor the program to determine useful-
ness, costs, and responsiveness of companies to investors' needs.
Contrary to the 1976 release,45 the Report recommends a
"safe harbor" rule for both SEC filings and informal disclosures to
remove one obstacle to disclosure of soft information. The safe
42. Id. Although not yet adopted, these guides are being applied by the Division
of Corporation Finance. Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Hendricks & Tomlinson Staff Reply, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80, 664.
The "reasonable basis" suggested by the guides may be a history of operations or
experience in projecting and may be supported by an independent outside review by a
qualified expert. The format would appropriately include at least forecast revenues,
net income and earnings per share presented either in the most probable specific
amounts or most reasonable range. The guides suggest that investor understanding
may be facilitated by disclosure of the assumptions underlying the projections. Inves-
tors should be cautioned against attributing undue certainty to the projections and
should be informed of management's plans to update. Also, management should con-
sider analysis of variances between prior forecasts and specific results.
43. Voluntary disclosure was deemed appropriate at this time by the Advisory
Committee, because the SEC does not yet have an adequate basis for specific rules
and regulations; not all public companies are in a position to disclose projections, and
it was felt that none should be compelled to expose themselves to risks of litigation or
liability. REPORT, supra note 3, at 354. Another justification is that permissive disclo-
sure was considered an appropriate transitional stage of development from the prior
policy of prohibition of projections. Id. at 354. The 1976 projections release sug-
gested that mature companies or those with experience in projections may have a
better basis for projections than other companies. Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,461. But the Advisory Commit-
tee disagrees and would permit projections by all public companies. REPORT, supra
note 3, at 356-57.
44. REPORT, supra note 3, at 354-55. Entirely apart from legal considerations,
many corporate managers believe the publication of projections will result in loss of
credibility with investors since projections are highly speculative in most situations.
An important legal concern is the potential liability for projections that do not pan
out. See note 64 & accompanying text infra.
45. Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,461.
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harbor would be available unless it is proven by the plaintiff that
the information was without basis or was disclosed otherwise than
in good faith.
46
In the 1976 release, the Commission had determined that a
safe harbor rule was hardly necessary, given that the law probably
would not be changed by a rule which excused only appropriately
qualified good faith statements made with a reasonable basis.
47
However, corporate managers may find more comfort in an ex-
plicit rule than in the meager case law from various lower federal
courts.
4 8
In any event, there seems little disadvantage to a safe harbor
rule except that its application may well be so subjective that its
promise will not be fulfilled. This subjectivity is likely to provide
cold comfort to sophisticated securities lawyers.
The Report also suggests that disclosure of projections be ac-
companied by a cautionary statement regarding their inherent un-
certainty, as the 1976 proposed guides require49 and most
commentators recommend. 50 Although disclosure for sophisti-
46. The Report supplies a proposed safe harbor rule in the following form, in-
cluding not only projections but other soft data:
A statement of management projections of future company economic
performance or a statement of management plans and objectives for
future company operations shall be deemed not to be an untrue state-
ment of material fact; a statement false or misleading with respect to
any material fact; an omission to state a material fact necessary to make
a statement not misleading; or the employment of a manipulative, de-
ceptive or fraudulent device, contrivance, scheme, transaction, act,
practice, course of business, or an artifice to defraud; as those terms are
used in the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
or the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, or rules and regu-
lations thereunder, unless such information: (1) Was prepared without
a reasonable basis; or (2) Was disclosed other than in good faith.
REPORT, supra note 3, at 364. This is virtually identical to the safe harbor rule for
replacement cost information. Regulation S-X, § 3.17(g), 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17(g)
(1977).
47. Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,461. See generally notes 79-119 & accompanying text infra.
Although it has withdrawn the proposed safe harbor rules for projec-
tions, the Commission is of the view that reasonably based and ade-
quately presented projections should not subject issuers to liability
under the securities laws, even if the projections prove to be in error.
The Commission realizes that even the most carefully prepared and
thoroughly documented projections may prove inaccurate.
Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,461.
48. It is possible that the securities law provisions immunizing persons who rely
on SEC rules would give independent authority to the safe harbor rules. See § 19(a)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1976); § 23(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)
(1976). But see text accompanying note 104 infra.
49. Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,461.
50. See REPORT, supra note 3, at 357 n.19, A-301 n.3; cf. id. at A-321 n.5 (sug-
gesting investors may not be as gullible as the Commission assumes).
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cates does not require this cautionary note, it is probably not a
costly requirement.
Surprisingly, and without much defense of its view, the Advi-
sory Committee advises against compulsory disclosure of assump-
tions underlying projections, although the materiality of
assumptions in assessing forecasts is acknowledged.51 The justifi-
cation is lack of Commission experience and the Advisory Com-
mittee's hope that minimizing requirements will maximize
voluntary projections.5 2 In accordance with the SEC's 1976 pro-
posed guides, comparison with actual results on a voluntary basis
is recommended. 53
The Advisory Committee offers several other specific propos-
als concerning projections:
b. The items of information to be forecasted should rest
within the discretion of management, but should be those most
relevant in evaluating the company's securities and should not
be items whose projection would create materially misleading
inferences;
c. Third party review of management projections should
be permitted but not required;
d. Projections previously issued by management having
currency at the time a registration statement is filed should be
required to be included in the registration statement in their
original form, or where necessary, in modified form;
e. The time period to be covered by the projection should
rest within the discretion of management; and
f. Inclusion of projections in one Commission filing
should not "lock" the registrant into including projections in
future filings; likewise, registrants should be permitted to re-
sume the inclusion of projections in filings after a prior discon-
tinuance. However, companies should be encouraged not to
discontinue or resume projections in filings without good
cause.5
4
Given the great relevance and perhaps greater unreliability of
projections, it is likely the battle over the role of projections as
disclosure information will continue. Perhaps a second experi-
51. Id. at 358.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 359.
54. Id. at 345-46. The 1975 and 1976 SEC releases on projections likewise did
not require updating but cautioned management about possible deception. Sec. Act
Release No. 5581, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,167;
Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,461. See note 193 infra (concerning the duties to correct statements innocently but
incorrectly made and statements correct when made but which have become incor-
rect). "Lock-in" of a company to a projection policy was proposed in 1973, Sec. Act
Release No. 5362, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,211,
but eliminated in 1976, Sec. Act Release No. 5699, supra. The Advisory Committee
would discourage erratic disclosure. REPORT, supra note 3, at 367.
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ment involving mandated disclosure will be necessary. Even then,
one suspects that the tension between investors, who would like to
know the future, and management, who are not seers, will never
be resolved satisfactorily.
Nevertheless, the Report's recommendation that voluntary
projections be permitted and facilitated by the SEC seems correct:
indeed, the only clearly incorrect recommendation would have
been a proposal to revert to prohibition of projections. Any expe-
rience gained from disclosure of voluntary projections will aid in
formulating further steps. However, there is a subtle problem
even with permissive disclosure. A company will no longer be
able to defend a non-disclosure suit on the ground that disclosure
is prohibited.55
2. Management Analyses
The Report recommends the continuance of mandatory dis-
closure for managements' analyses of financial information.
5 6
The purpose of the management analysis requirement holds high
promise; it is designed to cause the people who know the hidden
facts behind the financial statements to give their special knowl-
edge of why that data should be interpreted in one way rather
than another.
It is probably fair to say that to date these analyses have been
nothing but banalities. The Report recommends amendments to
change the present boiler-plate character and to make them more
meaningful to readers. First, the Report states that management
should be given broader latitude in drafting. Second, it suggests
that the SEC recognize two separate aspects of the management
summary, quantitive analysis57 and historical data; both to be
presented on a segmented basis. Third, the Advisory Committee
recommends that the Commission induce staff review consistent
with the spirit of the requirement.
58
55. Cf. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973) (dis-
cussing the role of SEC policy disfavoring projections in proxy statements with re-
spect to non-disclosure of appraisals).
56. These are now required. Guide 1, note 7 supra; Guide 22 (1933 Act), note 7
supra.
57. By "quantitative analysis," the Committee apparently means the present
Guide 22 requirement of disclosure of amount of change between accounting periods,
for example, of all items of revenue and expense, and advising that a change should
generally be discussed if the item increased or decreased by more than 10% relative to
the prior period or by 2% of average net income or loss for the most recent three years
presented.
58. The proposed guide reads:
MANA GEMENTANAL YSIS OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
AND FOR WARD LOOKING INFORMATION
Provide an analysis for each business segment of the reported financial
19781
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A further innovation seeks to underscore to management the
importance attached to the analysis. The SEC would require a
letter from the chief financial or accounting officer stating that due
regard had been given to the requirements of this analysis and
particularly to that part which calls for the disclosure of any facts
and contingencies known to management which would make the
historical record not indicative of the future.59 Interestingly, the
Advisory Committee also recommends a "sunset" provision for
this letter requirement, suggesting that it be discontinued in three
years unless expressly extended by the Commission.
It has been said that one can lead a horse to water but cannot
make him drink. However, management may thirst for investor
approbation, and it would seem that no single disclosure device
has more potential than the management analysis. What could be
more meaningful than for investors to get the same inside infor-
mation managers have often supplied to friends and relatives?
Nevertheless, we may expect substantial opposition from financial
officers concerning the "due regard" letter. It not only smacks of
petty tyranny but may have the sting of personal liability which
only a few mascochists enjoy. The three-year sunset provision is a
welcome suggestion.
statement which (1) will enable investors to understand and evaluate
material periodic changes in the various items of the reported financial
statements, and (2) will enable investors to relate the reported financial
statements to assessments of the amounts, timing and uncertainties of
future cash flows for the reporting entity.
Instructions. 1. The analysis of material periodic chan~es (a) should
explain material increases or decreases in discretionary items such as
research and development costs, advertising expenses, and maintenance
and repair expenses, and (b) should break down variances into compo-
nents, such as the amounts by which changes in prices and changes in
volume resulted in a material change in sales.
2. The analysis should focus on facts and contingencies known to
management which would cause reported financial statements to be not
indicative of future operating results or of future financial condition.
This would include description of and amounts of (a) matters which
will have an impact on future operations or financial condition and
have not had an impact in the past, and (b) matters which have had an
impact on reported financial statements and are not expected to have an
impact upon future operations or financial condition. The form and
content of disclosures pursuant to this item will necessarily vary among
registrants and will change from period to period for the same regis-
trant as circumstances change. In general, the disclosures should be
similar to that which the chief executive officer might prepare for the
board of directors of a company. Both quantitative analysis and narra-
tive discussions are important.
REPORT, supra note 3, at 368-69.
59. Id. at 374.
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3. Dividend Policy, Capital Structure Policy, and Plans and
Objectives
In other departures from existing policy, the Advisory Com-
mittee recommends permissive disclosures of dividend policy,
60
capital structure policy (e.g, proportion of debt to equity), and
"plans and objectives" generally.6' Specifically, it recommends
five-year planned capital expenditures budgets and methods of
financing by business segment, indicating (a) amounts thereof re-
lated to production on the one hand and to environmental control
facilities, on the other, and (b) the expected effects on productive
capacity. 62 These all would be within the safe harbor rule de-
scribed in the projections section above.
63
Assuming that investors will engage in some form of funda-
mental analysis, these recommendations for increased disclosure
will greatly increase the available relevant evidence of a firm's
prospects, albeit with less than fully reliable data. Moreover, the
experiment will test the hypothesis of those critics who suggest
that market forces will cause managers to disclose meaningful
data. And, to the extent disclosures are in fact made, experience
with them may reveal the need to take additional steps to further
encourage, mandate, or prohibit disclosure. A period of experi-
mentation will also allow more time for necessary research on
60. At present, the note to rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9, note (1977), states
the SEC's long-standing policy against predictions as to specific future dividends, and
Guide 26 under the 1933 Act, Guide No. 26 for Preparation and Filing of Registra-
tion Statements, Sec. Act Release No. 4936, [1978] 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 3786,
outlaws projections of future dividends, although it permits a statement of policy to
declare dividends as a percentage of profits.
61. These include:
(1) plans for product development, marketing programs, methods of
financing, personnel, and general business strategy; (2) plans for expan-
sion, contraction or redirection of the business; (3) plans for the acquisi-
tion of other companies, which may or may not have been specifically
identified; (4) plans involving the disposal of existing assets; and (5)
plans regarding distribution of dividends to stockholders.
REPORT, supra note 3, at 378. Plans and proposals are now required of tender offerors
of registered offerings. See note 7 supra.
62. The proposed instruction reads:
ITEM 9. MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS AND FOR WARD LOOKING INFORMATION.
Instruction 4. Registrants are encouraged, but not required, to furnish
for each business segment a description of planned capital expenditures
and financing for (1) the current fiscal year and (2) the succeeding four
year period. If this information is furnished, it would be desirable to
disclose the amounts related to environmental control facilities and the
expected effects upon production capacity, and to furnish an analysis of
differences for the most recent fiscal year between previously disclosed
budgets and actual capital expenditures.
REPORT, supra note 3, at 377.
63. Id. at 375-79.
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portfolio analysis which, if its adherents' views are upheld, might
obviate the need for firm-oriented disclosure.
The Report, whatever it lacks in other ways, cannot be
faulted for proposing careful, yet progressive experimentation.
III. DUTIES TO DISCLOSE SOFT INFORMATION TRUTHFULLY
There are two distinct disclosure systems under the securities
laws: (a) disclosure mandated or permitted by statutory or regula-
tory provisions, and (b) disclosure induced by potential fraud lia-
bilities.64
If the SEC accepts the Advisory Committee's recommenda-
tions to permit and encourage, but not mandate, disclosure of soft
information in SEC filings and elsewhere, issuers will of course be
concerned about the risks of fraud liability and the costs of litiga-
tion from such disclosure or failure to disclose.
65
There are two broad types of fraud liability: for affirmative
misrepresentation and for failure to disclose. Because of the lat-
ter, when the SEC merely permits disclosure, it may be that in
several contexts this permission, in conjunction with fraud liabil-
ity for failure to disclose, mandates disclosure. In other words,
removal of prohibitions against disclosure may give reign to the
coercive effect of fraud liability for mere silence concerning soft
data when there is a duty to disclose material information.
Hence there are two reasons for considering the potential
fraud liability for soft data: (a) to examine the exposure to liability
from publication of soft data; and (b) to determine when, if ever,
disclosure of soft information will be mandatory and not just per-
missive.
Several types of cases have arisen concerning misrepresenta-
tion in securities transactions; but the most important for our pur-
poses are cases of (1) affirmative misrepresentation, (2) failure to
disclose in conjunction with insider trading or tipping, and (3) the
issuer's affirmative duty to disclose.
As to affirmative misrepresentation, any person who mis-
presents material information, thereby damaging another, may be
liable on various statutory and common-law grounds to that other
person who buys or sells securities, depending on whether the mis-
representation was made negligently or with scienter, whether the
parties were in privity or had some other relationship, and
whether the loss transaction was causally connected with the mis-
64. Id. at XLIII-XLV.
65. Legal liability and cost of litigation are but two costs. Issuers will also be
interested in determining the costs of producing such data and the other costs and




The second category, insider trading or tipping, includes not
only the conventional case of an insider who trades on the basis of
undisclosed inside information or tips a confidant who trades, but
also certain other cases in which a person having a special rela-
tionship to an issuer while in possession of material inside infor-
mation acquires or disposes of securities. For example, this
category includes cases in which a company causes a redemption
or other repurchase of its own shares without disclosure of mate-
rial inside information.
67
In the first category, there is an affirmative misrepresentation,
but the alleged wrongdoer need not have engaged in a purchase or
sale transaction.68 In the second category, no affirmative state-
ment is required for liability to be imposed, but here there must be
an affirmative act: a purchase or sale transaction by the insider or
tippee. In the third category, the issuer's affirmative duty to dis-
close, which so far is quite unsettled, the question is whether an
issuer of securities who is neither trading (or tipping) nor making
any statements can be held liable for its silence to investors who
do trade at prices different from what they would have been had
the issuer publicly disclosed certain information.
69 In each of
these categories, there are special problems when the material in-
formation which is misrepresented or not disclosed is soft infor-
mation.
A. Affirmative Misrepresentations
1. Is it Necessary That Soft Information Be a "Fact"?
Most statutory and common-law articulations of rules against
misrepresentation refer to misrepresentation of a "material fact."
However, the "material fact" requirement is merely a convenient
way of describing what is capable of misleading a person, and
courts' analyses, for the most part, have acknowledged this. Many
courts have attempted to distinguish "fact" from "opinion," or
"fact" from "prophecy," and so on, without much comprehension
of the function of words. There is a distinction to be made. It is
not for the sake of sterile classification of facts and non-facts, but
for the purpose of distinguishing those utterances or non-utter-
ances which reasonably have a capacity to mislead from those
66. See generally 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW: FRAUD §§ 2.1-.7 (rev. ed.
1977) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERO].
67. See, e.g., Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 737 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc).
68. See generally 2 BROMBERG, supra note 66, § 7.6(1).
69. See, e.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d
514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
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which have no such misleading power.70 It should thus be appar-
ent that the important question is materiality, that is, whether
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable mind would
consider the datum important in making the investment deci-
sion. 71 If the datum is important in the decision-making process,
it could mislead if erroneous or omitted.
To illustrate, in First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson ,72 Walter
E. Heller & Co. was sued by a plaintiff who relied on an inaccu-
rate description of the relationship between Heller and its debtor-
customer, whose shares the plaintiff purchased. Heller had stated
to the plaintiff that it would be willing to loan more money to the
customer, that the relationship with the customer had been satis-
factory, and that the customer ran an "above-average operation"
and had always been prompt in meeting its obligations. In fact,
Heller suspected the customer's books of being false, payments
were three weeks in arrears, and three of the customer's checks
had bounced. 73
The trial judge in his oral charge to the jury accurately, al-
though inartfully, captured the true principle that an opinion, and
not only a fact, may be a basis for recovery under rule lOb-5. He
then went on, "I do caution you, however, that if it's an opinion
that is the basis for the claim, you still would have to decide that
that's a material matter that somebody's opinion is material in a
particular case."
'74
The appellate court affirmed, but, not appreciating the point,
stated the conventional nonsense that the characterization of Hel-
70. The question of whether a datum has the capacity to mislead should not be
confused with the question whether such a datum ir misleading.
71. The Supreme Court stated the test of materiality for proxy rule violations as
follows: "A fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable share-
holder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). There is a high degree of probability that
the "test" will be mouthed for other securities law purposes. Cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977) (applying the "test" to a lOb-5 action for
failure to provide advance notice of a short-form merger). See generally, Hewitt,
supra note 1, at 896-97.
Just what the concept of materiality means is not settled and probably never will
be, because it is nothing less than the concept of appropriate disclosure. See text
accompanying note 1 supra. When dealing with materiality, a court should ask just
what should be disclosed under the applicable policies of the particular securities law
provision in the particular circumstances. The inadequacy of the Supreme Court's
test is apparent when one considers the limiting function of the concept. See note 155
infra. Further evidence of the inadequacy of the Court's definition is the recent ex-
tension of the concept to environmental matters and questionable foreign payments
which may be of slight interest to investors. See generally Hewitt, supra note 1, at
914-44.
72. 559 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1580 (1978).
73. Id. at 1310-11.
74. Id. at 1318 n.5.
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ler's statement as fact or opinion is "particularly crucial." Never-
theless, the court avoided error by saying these "should be
classified as fact, rather than opinion, for present purposes.
75
This appears to be an unnecessary legal fiction.
76
For a further example, consider a sales projection by the sales
manager of a firm, published in the advertising section of a news-
paper and aimed at consumers of the company's product. The
projection would be different in quality from the same statement
made by the chief executive officer to a meeting of financial ana-
lysts. A court that would be concerned with whether either is a
"fact" or an "opinion" would be focusing on the wrong issue and,
thus, wasting resources; and possibly it could arrive at the wrong
result. The correct question is simply whether the projection rea-
sonably could mislead. Thus, even if the sales manager's projec-
tion were held not actionable, if a prospectus quotes him in a way
which would induce reliance, it should be actionable in that con-
text. One may imagine the tortuous reasoning a court might find
necessary, if, in the case when the sales manager's projection ap-
peared in the newspaper ad, the court held that there was no lia-
bility because it was merely an opinion. When the prospectus case
arises, could the court there hold that a "fact" is involved?
75. Id. at 1318. See also Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 514 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977) (representations to a securities buyer that a
favorable takeover by another company would probably occur held not a "fact");
Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting from
and following G & M, Inc. v. Newbern, 488 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1973), for the proposi-
tion that a projection may be a "fact"); Black v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 401 F. Supp.
693, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (question of whether earnings projection was "fact" or not
treated separately from materiality). Judge Doyle, on the other hand, in Nicewarner v.
Bleavins, cautiously and skillfully avoided the necessity for characterizing certain soft
information as fact or non-fact, finding another basis for non-liability. 244 F. Supp.
261, 264 (D. Colo. 1965). One trial court's instruction was particularly confused:
Statements about the future growth and development of a com-
pany are classed as opinions or facts, depending upon the circumstances
under which they were made. No recovery may be based on an expres-
sion of opinion. . . unless the opinion was completely unfounded and
reckless, or unless it was deliberately intended to be misleading. The
plaintiffs can also recover if you believe that the defendants gave any
definite opinions or assurances about the future which they thought
were false when they made them.
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734 n.8 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968).
The SEC has used language supporting the view that the emphasis is on "mate-
rial" and not "fact" by referring to "material information." Investors Management
Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 634 (1971); accord, In re The Boston Co. Inst. Investors, [Current]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,705, at 80,854, 80,856 (1978).
76. To obviate the problem, the American Law Institute proposed the following
definition: "'Fact' includes (a) a promise, prediction, estimate, projection, or forecast,
or (b) a statement of intention, motive, opinion, or law." ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 256
(March 1978 Proposed Official Draft).
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2. When Is An Incorrect Material Soft Datum Misleading?
When a published projection or some other item of soft infor-
mation not objectively true or false when made fails to eventuate,
under what circumstances will it be considered to have been mis-
leading when made? For some time there had been a school of
thought, sanctioned by the SEC, which held that projections and
other similar soft information in SEC-filed documents were per se
misleading. This was evidenced by the famous note (a) to rule
14a-9 of the Proxy Rules which formerly stated that "Predictions
as to specific future market values, earnings or dividends" may be
misleading.77
Some courts subscribed to that view. A frequently cited ex-
ample is Union Pacific Railroad v. Chicago & North Western Rail-
way Co.78 The Union Pacfic case involved a contest to take over
the Rock Island Railroad and a contested proxy solicitation for
approval of a merger of the Rock Island with the plaintiff, Union
Pacific Railroad Company. The defendants, North Western and
its allies, had predicted savings of twenty-five million dollars if
their own offer were to be accepted in substitution for the Union
Pacific merger offer and another fifty million dollars if a contem-
plated additional merger were to occur. Defendants also had pre-
dicted subsequent share prices and specific earnings for their
proposed merged company. The court quoted Note (a) to Rule
14a-9, stating that it would pay great deference to the SEC, and
held "that such predictions mislead by conveying a certitude
which inherently they cannot possess."'79 This view of projections
has now been disavowed by the Commission ° and seems not to
have been followed by other courts.
Somewhat anomalously to the Commission's original view as
evidenced in the Union Pacific case, informal publication of soft
information (that is, outside SEC filings) has never been consid-
ered by the SEC or the courts to be per se misleading.81 Permit-
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9, note (1977); see note 58 supra. The Commission had
read the Note to prohibit projections, although the language is ambivalent. Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1292 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Brief of Amicus
Curiae SEC, Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir.
1968).
78. 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
79. Id. at 409. Professor Kripke states that this case held "that a projection was
misleading just because it was a projection, entirely apart from the question whether
in fact it might have been sound." Kripke, The SEC the Accountants, Some Myths and
Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1151, 1198 (1970).
80. See Sec. Act Release No. 5362, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) $ 79,211; Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,461.
81. There is an exception. As part of its precarious resolution of the dilemma
caused by the conflict between the affirmative disclosure rules and the "gun-jumping"
[Vol. 26:95
19781 SOFT INFORMATION
ting informal disclosures of soft information while prohibiting
filed disclosures seems ill-conceived.
82 One would rather have
projections appear in filed documents where they will receive SEC
scrutiny and policing.
Another potential line of development on this issue of when
soft data is a misrepresentation was formulated in Beecher v.
Able,83 in which the parties had stipulated that there no longer
was a legal prohibition of projections of future earnings in a pro-
spectus.8 4 The court held that projections must be based on facts
making realization "highly probable,"
8 5 thus practically outlaw-
ing forward-looking data for all but a few situations.
8 6
rules, the Commission encouraged continued disclosure while "in registration" except
for forecasts, projections, predictions, and opinions concerning values. Sec. Act Re-
lease No. 5180, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 78,192. See
also Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970); rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (discuss-
ing the basic conflict between disclosure and anti-gun-jumping).
Now that the SEC has discontinued its prohibitions on projections in filed docu-
ments, on the apparent basis that they are no longer per se misleading, it should
reconsider its express ban on informed projections when a company is in registration.
Although the gun-jumping question is concerned with whether the company is mak-
ing a selling effort prior to the filing of the registration statement in violation of § 5(c)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1976), the Report recommends that the SEC
permit companies to revise publicly (but presumably not to originate) projections dur-
ing the pre-filing period. REPORT, supra note 3, at 361. See also note 39 supra.
82. The disclosure practice for private offerings illustrates (a) the inapplicability
of the old SEC prohibition of forecasts to unfiled disclosure documents, and (b) the
unreality of the SEC view. Thus, in private placement offering statements (used to
satisfy the "access to information" requirement for private offerings under SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953)), sophisticated private placees have always
demanded and received projections because they consider them relevant.
There has been some suggestion that long-term projections may at least
in some cases be almost fraudulent per se on the theory that there can
be no reasonable basis for believing them to be sound. Nonetheless, the
usual private placement purchaser ordinarily will not even consider a
purchase unless he is furnished with long range forecasts running up to
five and sometimes ten years.
P.L.I. FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 42 (1970). "While an
S-1 must avoid any projections or forward looking information, the detailed projec-
tion and the underlying basis for it will be one of the most important types of infor-
mation for the sophisticated venture capitalist." P.L.I. SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON SECURITIES REGULATION 52 (1971).
83. 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
84. Id. at 346.
85. Id. at 346, 348.
86. In Beecher, the plaintiffs purchased debentures in a registered offering in July
1966, and sued under § I I of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), and rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977), claiming that misrepresentations were made in the regis-
tration statement which noted various production-delay problems and stated, "it is
very likely that net income, if any, for fiscal 1966 will be nominal." 374 F. Supp. at
345. In fact, a $52 million loss was ultimately reported.
The court, in its opinion on the § I I claim, found as a fact that the quoted state-
ment would be read as a forecast that the company would break even-which was
what the company's internal projections also indicated. Id. at 347. Echoing the rea-
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However, the Beecher "highly probable" test has not been
followed by other courts. Rather, the courts have attempted to
formulate standards based on good faith and the reasonableness
of the basis for the projection and of the form in which it is com-
municated. Although the cases are as yet inconclusive, it appears
likely that the courts eventually will settle on a rule which would
find forecasts which fail to eventuate to be untrue statements if:
(a) not made in good faith; or (b) the forecast lacks a reasonable
basis in underlying data or method of preparation; or (c) it is inad-
equately explained and qualified.8 7 Furthermore, these require-
ments probably will be held to define what is a misrepresentation
and will not be considered defenses. As such, they will be part of
a complainant's case-in-chief on which he will have the burdens
of pleading, going forward with the evidence, and persuasion.
88
An examination of some of the opinions which point toward these
principles follows.
a. Good Faith and Reasonable Basis. The decisions seem
to agree on the requirement of good faith, that is, at least an hon-
est belief in the forecast or other item of soft data.89 Thus in
soning behind the Union Pacfic-SEC approach described above, the court recognized
that projections are highly tentative but stated, "However, investors are likely to at-
tach great importance to income projections because they speak directly to a corpora-
tion's likely earnings for the future and because they are ordinarily made by persons
who are well-informed about the corporation's prospects." Id. at 348. Instead of
holding projections misleading per se, the court held, "[therefore [that] a high stan-
dard of care," should be imposed. Id.
87. The American Law Institute adopts this view (except for the third element,
which it leaves to agency rulemaking), stating: "A statement of a fact within the
meaning of section 256(a) is not a misrepresentation if it (1) is made in good faith, (2)
has a reasonable basis when it is made, and (3) complies with any applicable rule so
far as underlying assumptions or other conditions are concerned." ALl FED. SEC.
CODE § 297(b) (March 1978 Proposed Official Draft).
88. Section 3-17(g) of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17(g) (1977), also places
on the plaintiff the burdens for statements of replacement cost of plant and inven-
tories.
89. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 490 (9th
Cir. 1974); REA Express, Inc. v. Interway Corp., 410 F. Supp. 192, 196, 197
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 538 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1976) (all three of which
would find the soft datum untrue when it does not eventuate and there is neither good
faith belief in its accuracy nor reasonable basis for its determination). See also SEC
v. Pelorex Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,122 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (consent judgment for failure to update obsolete projections).
The general principle of a good faith requirement is settled in cases holding that
a false statement of present intention is fraudulent. Eg., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,
375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Stratton Group Ltd. v. Sprayregen, [Current] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,302, at 93,016-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In several other cases, it has
been held that there was good faith belief in the datum stated and that, even though it
did not eventuate, it was not a misrepresentation. Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552
F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977); SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715
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United States v. Grayson,90 a case involving extravagant claims of
expectable future oil royalties, Judge Learned Hand said:
As we understand it, Grayson's objection is. . . that opin-
ions, promises, or representations as to the future, will not sup-
Sort a charge of fraud. We have repeatedly held the opposite.
ndeed, it has been the law ever since 1896, that to promise
what one does not mean to perform, or to declare an opinion as
to future events which one does not hold, is a fraud.91
But what if, despite innocence, a forecast is published and it
has no reasonable basis either in fact or in method of computa-
tion?9
2
A priori good faith ought not to suffice in every case. It is
generally accepted that fraud includes statements innocently made
when there is no basis for knowing whether the statement is true.
93
In Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp. ,94 a forecast of earnings
was held misleading when, at the time, the company (CSC) had
not met internal projections or attained its anticipated market
share, had been running deficits of $500,000 per month for several
months, and had had marketing difficulties with one of its prod-
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 402 F. Supp. 823, 829 (S.D. Cal.
1975); Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aJJ'dper curiam, 464
F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972); Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).
Because some fault, either negligence or scienter, is required for liability to be
imposed under most common-law or securities-law liability provisions, the element of
untruthfulness involving bad faith will often be intertwined with the element of de-
fendant's fault. See, e.g., Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 490 (9th
Cir. 1974). In a related area, the SEC long ago had established that broker-dealers'
forecasts of earnings must be in good faith and have a reasonable basis. E.g., Kahn v.
SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961). These requirements are based on the "shingle
theory." "In brief, the theory is that when a broker-dealer goes into business (hangs
out his 'shingle') he impliedly represents that he will deal fairly and competently with
his customers and that he will have an adequate basis for any statements or recom-
mendations which he makes concerning securities." R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 676 (4th ed. 1977). See generally Cohen & Rabin, Broker-
Dealer Selling Practice Standards, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 691, 704-05 (1964); see
also I BROMBERG, supra note 66, § 5.3, at 97-98. A broker-dealer's projection "will
be fraudulent if it is not honestly held. . . . [Ilt must have some combination of these
factors, all in reasonable measure: (1) factual or historical basis, (2) investigation, and
(3) sensible method of computation or formation," Id. Although these cases gener-
ally involved huge predicted increases of prices or earnings, the underlying principles
seem equally applicable to an issuer's own statements, whether or not within more
conservative bounds.
90. 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948).
91. Id. at 866. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 701
(4th ed. 1971).
92. "Reasonable basis" must mean not only that the datum is based on sound
factual grounds but that the method of deriving the datum is sound. Marx v. Com-
puter Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974).
93. Eg., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); State
St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 112, 15 N.E.2d 416, 418-19 (1938); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526(b), (c) (1976).
94. 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974).
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ucts for which $7,000,000 in research and development (R&D)
costs were being carried as an asset. CSC had even considered
abandoning the project. The company had stated that, in accord-
ance with its usual accounting practice, when the system became
fully operational, it would begin amortizing the $7,000,000 and
that this would be done beginning in October of that year. Some
months later, estimates of $105,000,000 in revenues and one dollar
per share earnings for the year were also published. But, at that
time, CSC had not disclosed that the system was not operational
and that R&D costs were not yet being expensed. 95 Plaintiff
purchased 2,000 shares after hearing the two forecasts, believing
the R&D was being expensed and that profits of one dollar per
share after such expensing nevertheless were anticipated. When
the system was abandoned almost immediately thereafter, earn-
ings were reported at $0.41 instead of $1.00 per share after a write-
off of the R&D.
Summary judgment for the defendant was reversed, the court
stating that if either good faith or reasonable basis was absent,
there was a misrepresentation:
The next question is, was the forecast an "untrue" state-
ment. Of course in hindsight it turned out to be wrong. But at
least in the case of 'a prediction as to the future, that in itself
does not make the statement untrue when made. However, the
forecast may be regarded as a representation that on January
23, 1970, CSC's informed and reasonable belief was that at the
end of the coming period, earnings would be approximately
$1.00. That is what a reasonable investor would take the state-
ment to mean, and we believe it would be "untrue" when made
if CSC did not then believe earnings would be in that amount
or knew that there was reason to believe they would not be.
96
This established the good faith requirement. The court also went
on to require a reasonable basis, saying: "In addition, because
such a statement implies a reasonable method of preparation and
a valid basis, we believe also that it would be 'untrue' absent such
preparation or basis."
'97
95. In fact, this information was disclosed at an analysts' meeting but not other-
wise, and the plaintiff did not learn of it.
96. 507 F.2d at 489-90.
97. Id. A case illustrating satisfaction of the reasonable basis concept is Dolgow
v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), afdper curiam, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.
1972). The issue was whether the case against Monsanto Co. for allegedly misleading
sales and earnings projections could properly be denied class action status even
though defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied. The court, in
denying class action status, held that the plaintiffs had failed to show "a substantial
possibility that they will prevail on the merits." Id. at 669. The court expressly found
that defendant's internal data justified the forecasts, which were sound when made,
and were "reasonable and sound and well within the realm of normal business judg-
ment." Id. at 670. The forecasting process included development and multiple re-
views on a continuing basis of a long-range plan, budgeted sales and earnings, and
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What of the case where good faith is clearly present but cir-
cumstances are such that it is impossible to establish a very relia-
ble basis for the soft datum and that impossibility is disclosed?
For example, in the program-costing method,98 costs for tooling-
up and other preparation for production, as well as actual initial
production costs, are allocated over future periods proportionately
to expected future sales. However, a product may be so new and
unusual, and the market so untried, that it is impossible to ascer-
tain with any degree of certainty the probabilities for sales. Yet,
management may feel it desirable to suggest that profits are hoped
for, with full explanation of all the uncertainties. Would such a
statement be a misrepresentation?99
In Polin v. Conductron Corp. ,lO the Eighth Circuit in similar
circumstances held there was no misrepresentation as long as the
forecast was made in good faith. Similarly in SEC v. Geotek, l0
an oil drilling fund prospectus stated: "[wlhile it is not possible to
predict accurately at this time the allocation of net proceeds, it is
estimated that approximately . . . 5% [of such proceeds will be
utilized] for general and administrative costs."' 10 2 The SEC con-
tended that the five percent estimate was not feasible and that
prior programs' general and administrative costs had been closer
to thirty percent. The court held:
[T]here is insufficient evidence to show that the 5% esti-
mate . . . was other than a good faith estimate of general and
plant replacement and development budgets. The court found that these "were made
honestly, were reasonable, and were the best estimates of the people in Monsanto
most qualified to make them." Id. at 676. Further, it was held that these were "fully
supported by Monsanto's internal estimates and current experience," and changes
were currently and fully disclosed. Id. at 677.
Since reasonableness of basis must mean reasonable under the circumstances, it is
not expected that every projection must be as carefully prepared as in Dolgow. With
this reasonable basis requirement, contrast the Beecher v. Able requirement, see note
86 supra, that the forecast must have a high probability of being attained.
Concerning reasonableness of basis, consider the case of the president of one
listed company who, after stating a 1978 projection, said: "We exceeded our 1977
predictions, and we are completely confident that we will also exceed our predictions
for 1978."
See also Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Taylor v. Janigan, 212 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mass. 1962), modfed, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); SEC v. F.S. Johns & Co., 207 F. Supp. 566 (D.N.J.
1962).
98. See generally T. FIFLIS & H. KRIPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR BusINEss LAWYERS
190 (2d ed. 1977).
99. Of course, if the person who issues the qualified statement is in fact in posses-
sion of additional data which would alter the statement, it may be a misrepresentation
to fail to disclose the additional data. Cf. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d
278 (Del. 1977) (company owes a duty of "complete candor," see note 135 infra).
100. 552 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977).
101. 426 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
102. Id. at 753 (emphasis added).
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administrative costs, made by management and its legal coun-
sel, based upon certain new cost-cutting programs and an antic-
ipated increase in the sale of partnership interests in the 1971
programs .... 103
These results indicate the misrepresentation may be avoided
even when a projection is without a foundation, at least where the
lack of foundation is made reasonably apparent to investors.1° 4
Even Beecher v. Able 05 might excuse the utterance. The court
there said it would require disclosure of "any assumptions under-
lying the projection. . . tf their validity is sufficiently in doubt that
a reasonably prudent investor, if he knew of the underlying as-
sumptions, might be deterred from crediting the forecast. Disclo-
sure of such underlying assumptions is ' . . . necessary to make
• ..[the forecast] . . . not misleading . "... , ,106
But, possibly, such a disclosure of lack of basis will not avoid
a finding that the datum is an untruthful statement. This result is
especially likely to follow if the court accepts the view that even
naive investors are to be protected.'0 7 Of course, a disclaimer still
runs the risk of being held an invalid waiver; 08 and, moreover,
the representation that a waiver has been made may be fraudu-
lent. '09
b. Explanation, Qualification, and the Burden of Proof.
Good faith and reasonableness of the basis cannot suffice in every
case to avoid a misrepresentation. For example, a forecast that
sales will increase $10,000,000, even if in good faith and reason-
103. Id.
Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965), may be thought to rest
solely on a good faith requirement with no need to show reasonable basis for the
projection, but it probably does not stand for that proposition. As a basis for holding
that no liability had accrued for statements concerning predicted profits, production
scheduling, likelihood of success, and anticipated marketing arrangements, the court
concluded that the statements were made in good faith and that "it does not appear
that [defendant] could have known of their untruth by taking reasonable precau-
tions." Id. at 264. However, the court may have had an unstated rudimentary "rea-
sonable basis" factor in mind, for it noted that "there were circumstances which made
the statements believable." Id. at 264. It also pointed out: "[S]everal models of the
[item to be produced] were tested, and the indications were that remaining difficulties
could be eliminated. Plans for nationwide and even international distribution were
mapped out with companies and individuals capable of undertaking such an exten-
sive operation." Id. at 264. The case is probably best understood as one in which the
skimpy basis for the statement made was sufficient, because the statement did not
purport to represent anything more than what in fact was true.
104. See Ash v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 410 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (no mate-
rial misrepresentation in statement that "profits should improve").
105. 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See text accompanying note 83 supra.
106. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
107. See text accompanying notes 32-39 supra.
108. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc (1976).
109. Sec. Act Release No. 3411, [19761 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 25,095; Sec.
Exch. Act Release No. 4593, [1976] 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 25,095.
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ably based, may be misleading if there is no disclosure that cost of
goods sold will also increase by $10,000,000. Such a forecast
would be a half-truth. Other cases may include the need to dis-
close assumptions on which there is room for a difference of opin-
ion; for example, an assumption that interest rates will drop, if
included in an earnings projection, would seem to require disclo-
sure of that assumption in any case. Thus, the concept of the half-
truth has an important application to soft data, that is, qualifying
data must be disclosed.
Although few cases speak of this as a third requirement for
avoiding untruth, 110 the SEC in its release of Proposed Guide 62
for projections included the statement that "[T]he Commission
will not object to disclosure in filings with the Commission of pro-
jections which are made in good faith and have a reasonable basis,
provided that they are presented in an appropriate format and ac-
companied by information adequate for investors to make their
own judgments.""' The commentators, also, generally have
stated that qualifying data and contextual format must be dis-
closed. 112
In any event, these requirements of good faith, reasonable ba-
sis, and appropriate qualification should be considered elements
of the complainant's case--the showing that a misrepresentation
has been uttered. Hence, the plaintiff should have the burdens of
110. In Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., the court stated:
Whether CSC should have publicized all or some of the particular
problems it was experiencing with CT presents a nice problem. A com-
pany, of course, need not detail every corporate event, current or pro-
spective, which has or might have some effect upon the accuracy of an
earnings forecast. It must disclose only those facts which are material.
While we consider it doubtful that the failure to disclose any one of the
distinct problems besetting CT, taken by itself, would constitute an ac-
tionable material omission under the rule, we nevertheless cannot say
as a matter of law that the failure to disclose some or all of them would
not influence the decision of a reasonable investor. An earnings fore-
cast is a shorthand description of the general financial well-being of a
company; it creates an influential impression of the condition of the
company in the eyes of the investing public. Under the statute and rule,
when an earnings forecast is made, such facts should be disclosed as are
necessary to allay any misleading impression thereby created. In this
case, whether the failure to disclose the existence and nature of each of
CT's problems, or any partial combination of them was an omission "to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made
• * * not misleading" is a factual determination properly left to the jury.
507 F.2d 485, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1974) (omission in original) (footnotes omitted).
Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), required disclosure of as-
sumptions when necessary to make the forecast not misleading. See note 80 supra.
111. Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,461.
112. 2 BROMBERG, supra note 66, § 7.2(1), at 148-49. See also N.Y. STOCK Ex-
CHANGE COMPANY MANUAL A-22 (1977) (requiring that any projection be "appropri-
ately qualified").
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pleading, going forward with the evidence, and persuasion." 13
The SEC's safe harbor rule for replacement cost 1 4 and Proposed
Guide 62 for projections, 15 as well as the Advisory Committee's
proposed blanket safe harbor 16 all place these burdens on the
plaintiff. However, the point deserves mention because many ap-
parently thought that the defendant must establish his inno-
cence. "1
7
Another consideration which suggests that placing these bur-
dens on the plaintiff is appropriate is the arguable original under-
113. This is an elusive problem, caused by the fact that when a disclosed soft da-
tum, for example, a projection, fails to eventuate, it may be perceived as either (a) an
untrue statement when made but excusable'if made in good faith and with a reason-
able basis, or (b) a statement true when made if in good faith and with reasonable
basis. The difficulty is that §§ 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2)
(1976), both impose a duty of diligence or care on a defendant. Section 11 imposes
liability where any part of the registration statement contained an untrue statement or
omitted a material fact but imposes certain burdens of proving due diligence on the
potential defendants other than the issuer, who has no such defense. For example, for
non-expertised portions of the registration statement, the non-expert defendant must
show that "he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and
did believe, at the time such part became effective, that the statements therein were
true and there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading." Id. § 77k. Section 12(2)
similarly imposes a burden on the defendant.
This being so, it could be urged that it would be inappropriate for a court to
require a plaintiff under either of these sections first to prove that the defendant had
no good faith or reasonable basis, since the defendant would then have no burden of
proof, contrary to the statute. However, both statutory sections do require that there
be an untrue statement or omission, and the cases previously discussed all state or
assume that a projection is not an untrue statement when made merely because it fails
to eventuate.
See general, 2 BROMBERG, supra note 66, § 6.5(454), at 136.167-.168; Mann,
supra note 4, at 239. Bromberg states that if the SEC purports to adopt a safe harbor
rule to impose the burden on the plaintiff, this could be beyond its power if the stat-
utes are construed as imposing the burden on defendants. But he then also suggests
that under § 19(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1976), and § 23(a) of the 1934
Act, id. § 78w(a), a defendant who relies on the invalid SEC rule is nevertheless pro-
tected.
I disagree with this last conclusion, since it would seem that there can be no real
reliance on a rule concerning burden of proof. To cause the suggested effect, the
statute would have to read something like, "even an invalid SEC rule must be ob-
served by the court." In any event, I am convinced that none of these questions
should be raised because the first question is whether there has been a misrepresenta-
tion, and the plaintiff must prove that.
114. Regulation S-X, § 3-17(g), 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17(g) (1977).
115. Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,461.
116. REPORT, supra note 3, at 364.
117. In its proposed safe harbor for projections, the SEC suggested that the de-
fendant should have a defense. Sec. Act Release No. 5696, [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,406. See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D.
664, 668 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aj'dper curiam, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972) (defendant,
apparently out of an excess of caution, felt constrained to undertake the burden of
proving good faith, reasonable basis, and appropriate qualifications).
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standing of Congress, when the 1933 Securities Act was enacted,
that disclosure was to be aimed at sophisticated investment bank-
ers who could be expected to interpret and filter the data for lay-
men. ' 8 Because sophisticates can understand the limitations on
soft information, the burdens of pleading, going forward with the
evidence, and persuasion should be on the person claiming mis-
representation. "19
3. Justifiability of the Plaintiffs Reliance on Soft Information
The inherent unreliability of soft information undoubtedly
will make it somewhat more difficult for plaintiffs to recover in
actions which require reliance as an element.
20 Some decisions
which are expressly based on immateriality or on the conclusion
that an "opinion" and not a "fact" was involved perhaps could be
analyzed more clearly as cases in which the particular plaintiffs
reliance was unjustified.' 2' For example, a statement that next
year's profits are expected to exceed those of the current year,
when made with the slightest qualifications with respect to a com-
pany having a volatile earnings history, is unlikely to be relied
upon by the particular plaintiff.
B. Problems of the Co-relationship of Two or More Items of
Data When Only One of the Items is Published
When two or more bits of data have relevance to a company's
118. See notes 32-39 & accompanying text supra.
119. Prices will adjust for available information as interpreted by sophisticates ac-
cording to the efficient market empirical studies. Hence the market is a surrogate for
the unsophisticated who cannot overpay or sell at too low a price.
Professor Douglas said it all when he stated:
[E]ven though an investor has neither the time, money, or intelligence
to assimilate the mass of information in the registration statement, there
will be those who can and who will do so, whenever there is a broad
market. The judgment of those experts will be reflected in the market
price.
Douglas, supra note 38, at 524.
120. See generaly Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC
Rule JOb-3, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975).
121. The relationship between "materiality" and "reliance" is said to be this:
While materiality depends on whether the reasonable mind considers the datum im-
portant in the decision-making process, reliance involves the question whether the
particular plantiff considered it important. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,
462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
Professor Prosser states:
It is more correct to say, therefore, that a statement of opinion is a rep-
resentation of a fact, but of an immaterial fact, on which the law will
not permit the opposing party to rely. When, for any reason, such reli-
ance is regarded as reasonable and permissible, a misstatement of opin-
ion may be a sufficient basis for relief.
W. PROSSER, supra note 91, § 109, at 721 (footnotes omitted).
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prospects and only one of the bits is published, several difficult
questions arise because of their co-relationship. The first such
question already has been mentioned: the half-truth involving a
failure to qualify a statement made in order to make it not mis-
leading.1 22 The second is what might be termed the spurious half-
truth, involving two unrelated data, one "good" and the other
"bad." The third is the problem of a published datum which is
meaningless (but not otherwise misleading) unless placed in con-
text by disclosure of background data.
1. Half-Truths; Spurious and Legitimate
One technique for dealing with soft data is to apply the half-
truth concept liberally: a partial statement of the facts which
omits crucial qualifying information constitutes a misrepresenta-
tion.1 23
In certain situations, such as in proxy solicitations, tender of-
fers, or redemptions, disclosure of material information clearly
must be made regardless of the relationships among the individual
data. Thus, to illustrate with two items of hard data, loss of a
major customer and an ore discovery must both be disclosed, if
material. But assume that instead of a proxy statement, the issuer
merely publishes a press release to describe a major ore discovery.
Must the press release include all news about the company of a
material nature, including the loss of the major customer?
It might be thought that any disclosure which contains a da-
tum relevant to investors' needs is a half-truth unless it contains
all the material information known. Hence, it may be urged that
the press release concerning the material ore discovery should also
disclose the customer loss. However, if the half-truth concept
were applied indiscriminately in this situation, any press release
would have to be prepared similarly to a 1933 Act prospectus-a
costly requirement which surely would halt the flow of all infor-
mation. Moreover, investors do not expect press releases to be so
complete. Because of the unwieldiness of requiring full disclosure
of all data when a single datum is disclosed and because investors
do not expect such disclosure, courts should not apply the half-
truth concept to its fullest logical extent here. Rather, if disclosure
of the customer loss is required, it should be required on some
basis other than the simplistic half-truth concept. 24 On the other
122. See notes 102-03 & accompanying text supra.
123. Eg., In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964), Sec. Act Release No. 4710,
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,113 (basing the need to
disclose facts bearing on integrity of management on the mention of the chief execu-
tive's name).
124. For earlier, milder criticisms of over-use of the half-truth concept, see Schnei-
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hand, all material data relating to the ore discovery should be dis-
closed to avoid a genuine half-truth.
This problem is slightly more complex when one of the data
is related soft information. Is failure to disclose an earnings pro-
jection for 1978 simultaneously with an earnings statement for
1977 a spurious half-truth only, so that a court should not find a
misrepresentation? A different result would break with tradition;
courts have never required the disclosure of an existing forecast in
order to avoid a half-truth through publication of historical
financial statements.
One explanation for this result is that traditionally, as we
have seen, projections were prohibited in SEC filings and were
once even considered misleading per se.
125 Under these circum-
stances, a failure to disclose a projection hardly could be actiona-
ble.' 26 But, if the Advisory Committee's recommendations are
adopted, the historical basis for the exclusion of soft data from the
disclosure scheme should be irrelevant. Indeed, projections al-
ready are permitted. Nevertheless, in a recent case, the court de-
clined to break with tradition, holding that a forecast need not be
disclosed in a prospectus. 2
7 However, the court did hold that the
prospectus must disclose the underlying primary data which could
form the basis for an investor's determination that the prior earn-
ings trend would not continue.
28 That being so, one may expect
that, at least for firms with reliable forecasting experience, it may
not be long before the courts recognize true half-truth situations.
Initially, many courts probably will treat the SEC's permissive
view at face value; permitting but not mandating the disclosure of
soft information. But, as time passes, the logic of the half-truth
may well take hold and cause courts to require full disclosure of
the penumbral data.
Here we see the first indication of a possibility that when soft
data is no longer prohibited, instead of merely becoming permis-
sive, it becomes mandatory by virtue of the operation of the anti-
fraud rules. This can become a powerful concept. Since most
hard data is surrounded by a penumbra of soft information, which
der, supra note 2, at 271, 273; P.L.I. FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 70 (1974).
125. See notes 40, 77-82 & accompanying text supra.
126. E.g., Walpert v. Bart, 280 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Md. 1967), afdper curam, 390
F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1968); 2 BROMBERG, supra note 89, § 6.5(431)(3), at 136.122 (1977).
In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit
held that appraisals of assets in excess of book value need not be disclosed in a proxy
solicitation, resting in large part on the SEC's prior practice of prohibiting appraisals
in filed documents.
127. Strauss v. Holiday Inns, Inc. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 96,383 at
93,338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
128. Id. at 93,339.
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traditionally, at least in part, has been undisclosed, a vast new
area of mandatory disclosure may open up. We shall return again
to this theme.
29
2. Data Which Are Meaningless Without Additional Related
Information
Another difficult problem is the case of a published, unevalu-
ated datum which, in isolation, may be meaningless to inves-
tors. 130 The Texas GrulfSulphur opinion' 3 l obliquely addresses
this situation in dicta as an introduction to its section on what
constitutes material inside information required to be disclosed by
an insider who is trading.132 The Texas GulfSulphur court clearly
intended that only materially important basic facts need to be dis-
closed; there is no additional duty to disclose the insider's evalua-
tion of the data based on what may be termed background data
concerning the company or on superior analytical skills.
But does the issuer, as opposed to the insider, have an in-
dependent duty to provide background data or an evaluation of
the otherwise meaningless data? The concept of the half-truth de-
scribed in the preceding section (involving related data one of
which is good and the other bad) may apply, at least for back-
ground data, where one datum is in itself meaningless but would
become good or bad with the additional information.
Moreover, once soft information becomes of kin to hard data,
can the Texas Gulf Sulphur dictum 133 continue to protect insiders
who are able to interpret otherwise meaningless data solely be-
cause of their access to inside soft information, that is, background
129. See notes 171-93 & accompanying text infra.
130. Again, we are concerned here with press releases or other isolated disclosures,
not proxy solicitations or other situations where comprehensive disclosure is required.
131. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
132. An insider is not, of course, always foreclosed from investing in his
own company merely because he may be more familiar with company
operations than are outside investors. An insider's duty to disclose in-
formation or his duty to abstain from dealing in his company's securi-
ties arises only in "those situations which are essentially extraordinary in
nature and which are reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on
the market price of the security if [the extraordinary situation is] dis-
closed."
Nor ir an insider obligated to confer upon outside investors the benefit
ofhis superiorfinancial or other expert analysis by disclosing his educated
guesses or predictions. The only regulatory objective is that access to
material information be enjoyed equally, but this objective requires
nothing more than the disclosure of basic facts so that outsiders may
draw upon their own evaluative expertise in reaching their own invest-
ment decisions with knowledge equal to that of the insiders.
Id. at 848-49 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
133. See note 132 & accompanying text supra.
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data? Should the insider's fiduciary duty continue to be less for
soft data once such data are equated with hard? And, is the in-
sider's trading in this situation any less unfair than when he has
inside hard data?
On the other hand, the Texas Gulf Sulphur dictum with re-
spect to generally available information, that is, not including
background data, is consistent with the emerging view that disclo-
sure should be for the sophisticate. A sophisticated person can
evaluate the data for himself and at his own cost, not only in terms
of payments made to compile the data but also in terms of the
costs of coming to the wrong conclusion.
Nevertheless, as suggested above, for truly inside background
data, we might expect that courts will require disclosure of certain
data to allow a reasonable basis for investors to evaluate the mate-
rial data which are disclosed. Even in Texas Guf Sulphur, al-
though the company was not required to provide an education in
geology, it was required to provide additional data so that inves-
tors could view the full picture. Here the half-truth concept does
seem to apply legitimately to impose upon issuers and perhaps
insiders and their tippees a duty to disclose the relevant soft data.
C. Insider Trading on and Tpping of Soft Information
1. Soft Information as Inside Information-"Ripeness" and
"Materiality."
The classification of inside information as hard or soft does
not alter the broad outlines of the conceptual analysis of when an
insider who trades or tips others who trade has a duty to disclose.
Most soft information is inside information; that is, soft infor-
mation is largely undisclosed and originates within the firm. Fur-
ther, because much of it is highly material, for example,
projections and asset appraisals, 134 it is surprising that insiders are
allowed to trade at all. 135 The wonder of it all becomes even
134. Plans and proposals are also material items of soft data. As noted, disclosure
of plans and proposals is required in registered tender offers, showing that they are
material in the view of Congress. See note 7 supra. Although this, of course, does not
make them material for all purposes, it is highly persuasive. Plans to liquidate were
also considered material in proxy and insider trading cases. See Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp.
808, 843 (D. Del. 1951), mod#ed and afd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). In Nelson v.
Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1978), petitionfor cert.filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3159 (U.S.
Sept. 19, 1978) (No. 78-182), a plan to build the company into a marketable entity was
held required to be disclosed by an insider-purchaser. See generally 2 BROMBERG,
supra note 66, § 6.5(214), at 134.27.
135. Of course, when soft information such as an appraisal is prohibited in formal
disclosure documents, it would seem harsh to impose insider trading liability for fail-
ure to disclose informally. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D.
Del. 1951), mod#Fed and aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3rd Cir. 1956) (side stepping the issue).
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greater when one superimposes the SEC's recently expressed view
that an insider who trades while in possession of material inside
information violates rule lOb-5, even if his trade is not motivated
by the particular inside data. 136 Since insider trading restrictions
apply equally to issuers who buy or sell their own or an affiliate's
securities, 37 it follows that soft information, if material, must be
disclosed in issuer tender offers or other redemptions just as if it
were hard information.
a. The Issue of Riveness-or Unreliability. The nature of
But since the insider's alternative is simply not to trade, the dilemma of the issuer
prohibited from filing soft data is absent. Cf. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478
F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973) (proxy case).
The view has been expressed that an issuer (which may have a higher duty than
other "insiders") may have a duty to refrain from purchasing its own shares if it has
made internal projections, see P.L.I. FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REG-
ULATION 17 (1974), at least when the projections are off the trend or would "surprise"
the market. Id. at 18-19.
Even outside the federal securities laws, there is a significant body of state law to
the effect that there is a fiduciary obligation of insiders (including the issuer) to dis-
close material information to persons who sell their stock to the insider, at least when
there are "special circumstances." Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (Philippine
law); Lank v. Steiner, 43 Del. Ch. 262, 224 A.2d 242 (1966). Some courts do not even
require special circumstances. See Hotchkiss v. Fisher, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531
(1932); W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 583-86 (4th abr. ed.
1970).
Last year the Delaware Supreme Court held that a controlling parent corpora-
tion making a tender offer for the minority shares had an affirmative duty to disclose
material information which, in that case, was an appraisal of the value of the subsidi-
ary's net assets-a classical form of soft information. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.,
383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977). The court held that the parent owed a duty of "complete
candor" and that all information in its possession "germane" to the tender offer must
be disclosed. "Germane" was defined to mean "information such as a reasonable
shareholder would consider important in deciding whether to sell or retain stock.
Compare TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., [426 U.S. 438 (1976)]." Id. at 281.
In Lynch, the offeror disclosed that the net asset value of the company, an oil and
gas development firm, was "not less than $200,000,000 (approximately $16.00 per
share) and could be substantially greater," id. at 280 (emphasis in original), but failed
to disclose an item of soft information, an estimate by a vice-president of the com-
pany with special expertise in petroleum engineering fixing the value at $250.8 million
(or $20 per share) to $300 million (or $24 per share).
The court not only did not seem to require "special circumstances" but also held
that there was a breach in fact. That court's earlier opinion in Lank v. Steiner had
stated the "special circumstances" rule but failed to find any such circumstances,
holding for defendant. Thus, Lynch is especially significant.
It should be noted that, in both cases, there was a direct purchase and sale be-
tween the defendant, as seller, and plaintiff, as purchaser. The opinions may not ap-
ply to stock exchange transactions, see Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E.
659 (1933), and may not apply to sales by a defendant, since the seller may not be
deemed a fiduciary of the buyer until after the sale. See In re Cady, Roberts, & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907, 913-14 & n.23 (1961).
136. In re Sterling Drug., Inc., Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 14,675, [Current] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 81,570.
137. Eg., Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc).
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soft data is such that much of it is simply not ripe for disclosure.
In some cases it will be so infirm as not to be reliable; for example,
a sales manager may be in possession of knowledge of an increase
in the size of orders from several major customers but have no
further knowledge of the cause. Because of the unreliability of
this data, he should not be held liable for trading profits or tipping
others who profit. On the other hand, the court considered the
first drill hole in Texas GufSulhur138 sufficiently material to re-
quire disclosure before trading, even though its promise might not
have been borne out. 139 Of course, the soft information may be-
come outdated before it can be disclosed. 140
A fertile source of authority for an insider's duty to disclose
soft data is the tender offer cases. Although disclosure is expressly
required by the tender offer rules, 141 the theory is the same as for
insider trading: material facts must be disclosed to shareholders
who are invited to make tenders of their shares.
But softness is special, and it presents special problems. The
very trait which distinguishes soft information from hard is its un-
reliability, that is, "softness." Here too, the tension between the
low degree of reliability and the high degree of materiality of
much soft data suggests certain differences in the law of insider's
trading and tipping for hard and soft inside information.
In the tender offer area, the question is phrased in terms of
materiality, but the factors for consideration are much more com-
plex than a determination of what is important to investors. These
factors concern what I have described as "ripeness," or the unreli-
ability of soft information.
42
In addressing this question of ripeness, the court should con-
sider the specific circumstances of the case, balancing the advan-
138. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
139. Recall that the trial court in Texas GufSulphur held the first hole not "mate-
rial" on the basis that one drill hole does not show the volume of the mineralization,
which would require at least three holes. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F.
Supp. 262, 282-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The trial judge thus had a different taste for ripeness.
If the soft information is disclosed but does not eventuate in fact, liability for
misrepresentation may ensue if there was no reasonable basis for the datum. See text
accompanying notes 77-119 supra.
140. See the acknowledgment that data may become "stale" in Fischer v. Kletz,
266 F. Supp. 180, 184-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Com-
prehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842, 843 (2d Cir. 1970) (projections were consid-
ered in need of correction even after the actual data were published).
An apt illustration of various stages of ripeness is suggested by Gerstle v. Gam-
ble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973), involving gradations of valuations of
plant, which might range from an internal estimate through formal appraisals, to firm
offers, and finally to a sale, including all the intermediate stages.
141. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-101, Item 4, .14d-l(a) (1977).
142. Bromberg suggests that materiality and ripeness are "corollary" to the affirm-
ative duty to disclose. 2 BROMBERG, supra note 66, § 8.2, at 198 n.9.
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tages and disadvantages of non-disclosure and of outlawing the
insider's transaction. For example, a court should take into ac-
count the SEC regulations, the degree of hardness, the insider's
consciousness of the data, the unfairness of penalizing the insider
if his opinion turns out wrong, 43 the possibility that disclosure of
the soft data may in fact harm investors, 44 and the facility with
which the data appropriately may be disclosed and qualified.
45
This approach was used in Alaska Interstate Co. v.
McMillian, 46 to determine a tender offeror's duty to disclose cer-
tain soft information consisting of appraisals of oil and gas
reserves and a rough budget including forecasts of capital expend-
itures, non-cash items, and debt repayment schedules. These data,
prepared by the target management for internal purposes, were
never intended for publication. Clearly, the court viewed the
problem as one of balancing the relative unreliability 47 of the soft
data against its materiality:
This Court [has] recognized ... that no hard and fast rule
could be drawn about "soft information". The distinction be-
tween soft information which must be disclosed and that which
need not be was recognized as "one of degree", with determina-
tion of those categories to rest upon such factors as the impor-
tance of the information, the amount of subjective judgment
which the information reflects, and the practical difficulties in
fashioning a disclosure which would not create "more potential
for misunderstanding than enlightenment."'
' 48
The Alaska Interstate court then made it very clear that it was
143. See Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-Ob-5: An Emerging Remedy for
De/rauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1148 (1950).
144. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976). The Court
noted, "Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its disclo-
sure may accomplish more harm than good." Id See also Denison Mines Ltd. v.
Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 821 (D. Del. 1974).
Recall that one of the bases for banning soft data from SEC filings was the fear
that it would mislead investors. REPORT, supra note 3, at 348.
145. Contrast the ease of disclosing a dividend cut with the difficulty of describing
the effects of the first drill hole in Texas ui/Sulphur. See 401 F.2d at 843-47.
146. 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975).
147. The court recognized unreliability as an important concern:
This Court has recently had occasion to discuss the dangers inher-
ent in the disclosure of so-called "soft" corporate information. [We]
relied in particular on the Third Circuit's statement. . . of the "general
rule" that "presentations of future earnings, appraised asset evaluations
and other hypothetical data in proxy materials" was to be discouraged.
Id. at 567 (citations omitted).
148. Id. The court then juxtaposed two insider trading cases, Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), and SEC v. Lum's,
Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), with the facts in the case before it, stating
that in the Shapiro and Lum's cases the soft data was less soft. In those two cases the
soft information which was selectively disclosed to tippees consisted of short range
earnings forecasts for the current quarter in one case and the current year in the other
(both also revealed a substantial departure from the trend and were thus material).
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weighing reliability against materiality when it stated: "Accord-
ingly, while the forecasts [in Shapiro and Lum's] involved some
prediction, their reliability was not a factor of substantial signifi-
cance, and the importance of the information to investors far out-
weighed any potential for misunderstanding."'
' 49
The balancing process used by the court in Alaska Interstate
is a sensible method by which to determine ripeness for publica-
tion of soft data. Moreover, given the evolving attitude toward
the use of soft data, perhaps the general policy of discouraging its
publication should be reevaluated.
b. An Alternative." Materiality and the Market Price Impact
Test. One alternative to this balancing approach that restricts the
duty to disclose because of the unreliability of the data does so by
raising the standard of materiality. Instead of applying the TSC
Industries °50 standard of importance to investors, together with
the Alaska Interstate5 ' balancing process described above, it de-
fines materiality in terms of the likelihood that the undisclosed
datum will have a substantial impact on market price of the secur-
ities. 152
In the most significant case involving insider tipping of soft
information since TSC Industries, the court apparently endorsed
this more stringent test. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 153 held that
the selective disclosure to an analyst of an earnings forecast was a
tip of material information, while a disclosure that the introduc-
tion of two new products would be delayed was not material. But,
interestingly, the court, in expressly referring to the TSC
Industries definition, seemingly equated materiality with the mar-
ket impact test. Thus,
[ojnly when the inside information so "leaked" is essentially"extraordinary in nature" and "reasonably certain to have a
substantial effect on the market price of the security" if it is
publicly disclosed does a duty arise to make the informationgenerally available.
Thus, it becomes the judge's task to determine whether the
particular information conveyed would have been important to
a reasonable investor in determining whether to buy, sell or
hold a security.
154
149. 402 F. Supp. at 567 (footnote omitted).
150. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
151. 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975).
152. See, e.g., In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971); In re Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968).
153. 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
154. Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted). The court cited SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969),
which had stated the market price impact test and quoted the test in TSC Industries.
In Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830
(1974), the court viewed that test as being different from the importance-to-the-rea-
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The market impact test makes sense for publicly traded se-
curities-nothing else that also ought to be protected by the securi-
ties laws would matter to investors. Even if, for example, many
investors would like to know data relating to a pending merger
with a defense contractor because they would prefer not to be in-
volved with certain weaponry, if the price of their shares is not
affected, they may sell them and invest in non-defense manufac-
turers.1 55
For publicly traded securities, the market impact test also has
the merit of protecting insiders from liability in cases where they
could not profit monetarily-if there is no impact on price, they
cannot benefit. Finally, the test is consistent with an important
function of the materiality standard-the limiting func-
tion-which has been ignored too long.156 Just as the materiality
standard for admissibility of evidence at a trial limits the intro-
duction of evidence in order to provide a balance of the costs and
benefits, so too, materiality for securities law disclosure limits the
cost of preparation and processing of disclosure statements.
57
sonable-investor test and repudiated the former. Id. at 418. Although the corpora-
tion there was closely held, the court's opinion did not turn on this fact as it might
have. In a close corporation, the price of the shares will often not reflect intrinsic
value because of lack of an efficient market, and hence price will not be an assimila-
tion of (and therefore not a surrogate for) all material data.
155. Income tax consequences might accrue if they sell. But since they are not
compelled to sell, this may be a legitimate cost of their desire to avoid investing in
weapons manufacturing.
156. See Hewitt, note 1 supra. See also Beaver, Current Trends in Corporate
Disclosure, J. ACCOUNTANCY, January 1978, at 44, 49. Beaver points out that rule
405(t) promulgated under the 1933 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405() (1977), rule 12b-2
promulgated under the 1934 Act, id. § 240.12b-2, and Regulation S-X, § 1-02(n), id. §
210.1-02(n), expressly state the limiting function. Rule 405(/) states:
Material. The term "material," when used to qualify a requirement for
the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information
required to those matters as to which an average prudent investor ought
reasonably to be informed before purchasing the security registered.
Id. § 230.405(/).
157. The view that disclosure should be for sophisticates only will also be relevant
in limiting disclosures under this materiality test. For example, in SEC v. National
Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), a takeover was to be followed by a merger. Must the
offeror also state that the merger would enable use of the target company's assets to
pay off the loan used for the takeover? The Supreme Court intimated that would be
material, but Bromberg properly points out that any sophisticate would note this as
an obvious consequence of the merger. 1 BROMBERO, supra note 66, § 6.3(462), at
118.9 (citing Electronics Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., [1967-1969
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,323, at 97,527 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where
the court did not think the bootstrap possibility material).
See also Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.
1967) (holding that no disclosure of the difference in taxability of a merger and a sale
of assets was required since investors are expected to know of the difference).
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2. Selective Disclosure
Three concepts of selective disclosure, when analyzed to-
gether, pose difficult problems for courts seeking to ascertain the
parameters of the duty to disclose soft information truthfully. We
have seen that it may still be good law that a published datum,
meaningless or ambiguous without further evaluation, need not be
evaluated by a trading insider applying his knowledge for-the ben-
efit of the outside buyer or seller where that knowledge is not
company-originated inside information. 15
8 In this situation the
primary datum may have to be disclosed but need not be ex-
plained before an insider may trade on the basis of his own evalu-
ation of that datum.
There is another principle, observed in formal disclosure con-
texts, for example, a proxy statement, to the effect that individual
bits of immaterial data, which in the aggregate become material,
must be considered material and be disclosed.'
15 9
At the same time, it has been asserted that an insider may
with impunity tip others as to information which is not indepen-
dently material and which the tippee may weave into the matrix
of knowledge obtained elsewhere. Indeed, in SEC v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc.,160 the Second Circuit noted in dicta that corporate
issuers are "[e]xhorted by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and the various stock exchanges to divulge tidbits of non-
public, 'non-material' information" to the inquiring analyst.'
6'
This "mosaic theory"' 62 has been outlined in the following man-
ner:
As commonly stated, the mosaic theory asserts there are two
types of information:
1. Information which, standing alone, has importance.
2. Information which, standing alone, has no importance but
assumes importance when considered in light of the grand mo-
158. See notes 130-32 & accompanying text supra.
159. See 2 BROMBERG, supra note 66, §§ 6.5(414)(25), (426).
160. 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
161. Id. at 9. The court supported its assertion with the following:
See e.g., New York Stock Exchange Company Manual (July 18, 1968);
Address by Phillip A. Loomis, Jr., General Counsel, SEC, "Corporate
Disclosure and Inside Information", Financial Analysts Federation,
October 7, 1968; Address by Richard B. Smith, Commissioner of the
SEC, "Corporate Disclosures to Security Analysts", Graduate School of
Business, The University of Chicago, May 8, 1969; Address by Ray
Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the SEC, "The Role of Financial Public Rela-
tions", Chicago Publicity Club, March 13, 1974. Cf. Guidelines for the
Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities are in Registration,
Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5180 (August 16, 1971).
Id. at 9 n.l.
162. As pieces of a mosaic are meaningless until put in place by one who makes
the design, so too are some data immaterial except to one who has additional knowl-
edge, skills, or data.
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saic of other information about the company. . . .The impli-
cation of the mosaic theory is that [the second class of items]
can be [given to or] obtained [by tippees] without fear of legal
liability.
163
Is the mosaic theory consistent with the aggregate materiality
concept and the principle that a trading insider need not publish
his own evaluation of disclosed data?
The three concepts may be rationalized as follows. It may be
urged that the aggregate materiality concept, holding that several
immaterial items may become material in the aggregate, applies to
formal disclosure documents where all material information must
be disclosed, and that these are documents intended to be com-
plete within their own confines. In contrast, the insider evaluation
and mosaic theory concepts are concerned with the informal dis-
closure required when an insider trades or tips. Even though the
insider must disclose all material inside information before trad-
ing or tipping, this means all previously undisclosed material in-
formation. Thus, consistent with the mosaic theory, he need not
publicly disclose an immaterial bit of information.
On the other hand, if that bit becomes material when aggre-
gated with another bit of public information, by itself immaterial,
then the insider presumably must disclose. Thus, the mosaic the-
ory should not permit tipping of a bit of data which becomes ma-
terial in the light of previously disclosed data. Yet, this is the very
heart of the mosaic theory; it is believed acceptable to tip an ana-
lyst with an individually immaterial datum which he can aggre-
gate with other data to establish a material fact. The mosaic
theory, therefore, is inconsistent with the aggregate materiality
concept unless it is limited to formal disclosure.
Similarly, the insider's freedom to evaluate disclosed data,
without disclosure of his evaluation, presupposes that all primary
data have been made public, contrary to the mosaic theory, which
involves tipping an analyst without informing all the public.
Hence, the mosaic theory is not merely a special case of an in-
sider's freedom to retain his own evaluation before trading or tip-
ping.
But the mosaic theory arguably is grounded in a legitimate
public policy: because analysts serve the useful function of ferret-
ing out information for many firms,'64 the analyst must be al-
lowed to obtain and use "tidbits."'165 It is argued that the purpose
163. Beaver, supra note 155, at 50.
164. This is true for only about 1,000 publicly held firms. REPORT, supra note 3, at
XXIII. The rest of the 10,000-odd public companies have no serious analyst follow-
ing. Id. at 39.
165. Kripke, An Unusual Opportunity for Rethinking Concepts on a Fundamental
Level, N.Y.L.J., December 13, 1976, reprinted in SEC- 1977 (N.Y.L.J. Press 1977)
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of the mosaic theory is to facilitate the flow of information among
advisors to investors. However, Beaver suggests that selective dis-
closure to a few advisors restricts competition in evaluating the
data since not all advisors have the selectively disclosed item.
Moreover, what is material to one analyst may be material to an-
other; hence the mosaic theory violates the policy of the securities
laws that equal access to information be available to all. 166 He
concludes that the merit of the mosaic theory is not self-evident.
Arguably it proves too much. It is little different from saying that
the analyst ought to be allowed to be given any-even indepen-
dently material-inside information which would further en-
courage the analyst to serve this ferreting function.167 It seems
that Beaver is correct: information which is material to the analyst
is material to the public, and the mosaic theory rests on a precari-
ous footing.
All that has been said so far about the mosaic theory applies
equally to hard and soft data. The special problem with soft data,
however, is that much of it is immaterial by itself; therefore, it is a
prime candidate for application of the mosaic theory. If the the-
ory is wrongly followed by the courts, much abuse could result.
Another special problem is associated with soft information.
As noted previously, the issuer commonly provides the placee
with projections in private placements. 68 Is this illegal tipping?
There is no doubt on the question if the placees also trade. 69 But
what of the shares privately placed, assuming a primary offering?
It can be said that they were purchased on the basis of inside in-
formation. In Texas Gulf Sulphur, where certain individuals re-
ceived stock options while in possession, of inside information not
known to the stock option-granting committee, the court found a
violation of rule 10b-5.170 But even where the board knows of the
information, the private placee's purchase dilutes the interests of
other shareholders. And, certainly, if the private placement were
motivated by a desire to grant an advantage to the placees rather
than by the issuer's need for funds, the transaction should be ille-
gal.
(suggesting that limiting the analyst in his search for information may lead to a less
efficient market).
166. Beaver, supra note 155, at 51. Beaver also suggests consideration of various
cost-benefit issues. Id.
167. This result would be reminiscent of the view of Henry Manne that insiders
should themselves be able to trade on inside information. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRAD-
ING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
168. See note 82 supra.
169. P.L.I. FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 43 (1974).
170. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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D. Special Problems of Soft Information When There is an
Affirmative Duty to Disclose
Although it is by no means settled, under rule lOb-5, when an
issuer's securities are being traded in some market, the issuer may
have an affirmative duty to disclose material information even if
the issuer and its insiders are not trading, tipping, or otherwise
recommending trades. 171 Presumably, based on principles of vica-
rious liability developed under rule lOb-5, certain participants in
the breach of duty also may be held vicariously liable for the is-
suer's breach on a theory of aiding and abetting, conspiracy, or
otherwise.172 The case authority is rather inconclusive, because no
case squarely imposes liability on this basis. Rather, the courts
have skirted the main problem, finding limitations on the duty
without deciding whether one exists. Thus it seems to be generally
accepted, if not settled, that when the issuer has a valid business
purpose for non-disclosure of a datum material to investors, that
datum need not be disclosed even if non-disclosure may result in
injury to investors.
173
Additionally, it is probable that, even absent such judgment
of the corporate managers, if information is not "ripe" for disclo-
sure because it is still uncertain, no duty exists.1 74 "Ripeness"
means that the data "must be verified sufficiently to permit the
[management] .. .to have full confidence in their accuracy."'
75
171. See, e.g., 5A A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5, § 88.04 (rev. ed. 1977).
It was probably not contemplated that an issuer should have the right to maintain
silence forever concerning material facts, and to the extent that periodic reporting
requirements do not apply, the only legal basis for disclosure would be one of the
anti-fraud rules. One policy basis for imposing an affirmative duty to disclose is that
insider trading is common; and if the rules against such trading without disclosure are
to work in fact, the issuer, not the insiders, must undertake a regular disclosure pro-
gram. Another basis for imposing the duty is that rumors frequently circulate, and
without issuer disclosure there is likely to be misinformation amounting to misrepre-
sentation whenever anyone trades.
172. See 3 BROMBERG, supra note 66, §§ 8.5(500)-(540); 5 A. JACOBS, supra note
171, § 40.02-.04.
173. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Astor v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
174. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
175. Id. at 519. The Tenth Circuit also includes in the ripeness test the question
whether there is a business purpose for non-disclosure. The reason for the ripeness
requirement, according to this opinion, is "the hazards which arise from an erroneous
statement," presumably the danger of deception to investors. Id. at 519. This is akin
to what we have already seen was one reason why soft information once was alto-
gether prohibited in formal filings.
The opinion predates the later stages of the soft information revolution. It could
be read as merely holding that soft information need not be disclosed until "verified
sufficiently." In this sense, soft information is never ripe. If that is the reading of the
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Prudent corporate legal advisors probably should assume that is-
suers have an affirmative duty to disclose under rule lOb-5.1
76 For
issuers which have shares listed on a stock exchange, the rules of
that exchange may eliminate any doubts by imposing the duty ex-
pressly.17
7
When projections and other soft data were prohibited from
formal SEC disclosure documents, although not from informal
publication, 78 it was probably safe to withhold that soft data.'
79
A complainant hardly could urge that a projection prohibited in
formal documents was mandated in an informal publication, and
the absence of decisions on point is probably due to the fact that
no plaintiff has had the effrontery to urge the matter seriously.
However, now that projections and other soft data are per-
mitted, 180 or mandated,' 81 in formal documents, and if they are to
be "encouraged" in accordance with the Report,
82 the independ-
ent affirmative duty to disclose, as suggested above,
8 3 may oper-
ate to mandate disclosure of material soft information just as it
would mandate material hard data.
184
Nevertheless, even if an affirmative duty to disclose exists, the
unique characteristics of soft information require management to
engage in a special analysis to determine the need to disclose a
specific datum. This analysis often may reveal a valid business
purpose for non-disclosure of certain soft information. To illus-
trate, a plan to initiate a fifth generation computer, if disclosed too
early, could inhibit sales of the fourth generation stock.'
85 Doubt-
case, it has not been followed, and the case is of no precedential value outside the
Tenth Circuit, where it would be weak authority. However, the case has not been so
interpreted.
176. That is to say, one may not safely assume that there is no such duty.
177. E.., N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL 4-18 (1977). Of course, the
remedies for the breach of duty to observe a stock exchange rule of disclosure may
not include all the same remedies available under rule lOb-5 generally. See R. JEN-
NINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 89, at 889-91.
178. See notes 77-82 & accompanying text supra.
179. If formal disclosure is prohibited by the SEC, a good defense to a failure to
disclose soft data in formal documents may be established. The SEC's practice of
banning appraisals has been held to be a defense to an action for failure to disclose
such appraisals in proxy materials. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281,
1294 (2d Cir. 1973).
180. See note 7 supra.
181. Id.
182. See note 31 supra.
183. See text accompanying notes 128-29 supra.
184. Cf. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) (data in question consisted of a six-month
earnings statement).
185. This discussion is not concerned with any potential claims a purchaser of a




less, many questions will arise as to what constitutes a valid busi-
ness purpose. 86 For example, is it a valid business purpose for an
issuer to withhold information pertaining to a planned takeover
when disclosure would diminish the possibility of success?
187
In addition, no disclosure is required When, in the business
judgment of management, the datum is not yet "ripe."' 88 Since,
by definition, soft information is subjective or future-looking, and
not objectively verifiable, it frequently may be unripe.'8 9 In the
most important case on the affirmative duty to disclose, Financial
Industrial Fund, 90 the court found no breach of the duty; because,
in the judgment of management, the soft data were too unripe for
disclosure. The data, a six-month earnings statement showing a
decline, was published after plaintiff had purchased shares in the
market. The court concluded that the defendant had sought dili-
gently to calculate the estimated earnings and had published them
on the day following its evening determination, in effect finding
the information not ripe before that time.
Even the court in Texas Gulf Sulphur touched on the subject,
stating that materiality "will depend at any given time upon a bal-
ancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur
and the anticipated magnitude of the event in the light of the to-
tality of the company activity."' 9' Moreover, in Richardson v.
White, Weld & Co.,1 92 a failure to disclose a corporation's views
on the anticipated results of a massive lobbying campaign to de-
regulate natural gas was held not actionable on the basis that the
186. Even in the case posed, the ethical questionability of not informing fourth
generation computer purchasers may raise a question of the validity of the business
purpose. But cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F.
Supp. 1333, 1338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (purpose of concealing the ore strike from land-
owners in order to facilitate land acquisition was held a valid business purpose). The
perennial business reason for any non-disclosure has been that disclosure would hin-
der competition. Presumably, the courts will require more than just the assertion of
this reason as an excuse.
187. Consider the treatment of contingent liabilities not probable of assertion
when an auditor requests such information from a lawyer. If the liability is not prob-
able of assertion, it need not be disclosed. The business purpose of non-disclosure is
largely to avoid triggering assertion by the potential claimant. A putative investor
would like to know of such contingent liabilities, but the practice sanctioned by the
ABA is not to make the disclosure to the auditor, thereby avoiding disclosure to in-
vestors. See American Bar Association, Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Re-
sponses to Auditors' Requestsfor Information, 31 Bus. LAW. 1709, 1712 (1976).
188. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas, 474 F.2d 514, 519 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
189. Indeed, if "ripe" means objectively verifiable, as is intimated in FinancialIn-
dustrial Fund, soft information by definition may never be ripe. See notes 3, 175
supra.
190. 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
191. 401 F.2d at 849 (emphasis added).
192. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,448 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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data were not material, 93 although the more precise basis seems
to be lack of ripeness.
It thus appears that if there is an affirmative duty to disclose
material information, soft data are less likely to be required than
hard data, because soft information, by its very nature, is often
unreliable and hence not ripe for disclosure.
E. Duty to Update, Correct, or Disaffirm- "Staleness"
Although the very "softness" of soft information may fre-
quently excuse an issuer from an affirmative duty to disclose, this
same softness usually will result in soft data, such as a projection,
forecast, or appraisal which is published, not being perfectly on
target, thereby raising additional problems for issuers. If the soft
datum fails to eventuate precisely as stated, there will be the ques-
tion whether some duty to update, correct, or disaffirm arises.
194
The basic issues underlying most of these problems are whether,
under the circumstances, investors may be misled by the uncor-
rected original statement and whether the pecuniary and nonpecu-
niary costs of revising the data would be excessive.
193. Id. at 93,611-13. See also Berman v. Gerber Products Co., [Current] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,506 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Denny v. Barber, 73 F.R.D. 6, 9
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Natefli, 527 F.2d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976)(failure to correct financial statements in proxy statement);
Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1974) (failure to
correct a prior statement of a plan to begin amortization of research and development
costs for an invention); Green v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 413, 418-20 (D. Ore. 1973)
(duty to correct statement of another when it had been adopted by issuer); SEC v.
Pelorex, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,122 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(consent judgment for failure to update projections); Gould v. American Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 868 (D. Del. 1972), aI'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976) (duty to correct proxy materials); Moerman v.
Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), a'dper curiam, 422 F.2d 871 (2d
Cir. 1970) (failure to correct statement of third person); Electronics Specialty Co. v.
International Controls Corp., 296 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969) (no duty to correct statement of a stranger).
The term "update" may be taken to refer to a duty to publish new data when the
prior statement was correct when made but no longer holds true because of interven-
ing developments. The term "correct" may be taken to refer to a duty to correct a
statement incorrect when made. A duty to "disaffirm" may arise when rumors are
circulating or statements made by others are to be refuted. Disaffirmance refers to
denying such statements, not substituting the correct facts for them.
What looks to one court like a question of a duty to correct may appear to an-
other to be an affirmative duty to disclose. Consider Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973),
which, as we have seen, was considered to be in the latter category. In the trial court,
however, instead of being considered a case involving the affirmative duty to disclose
six months' earnings, it was viewed as a question of the duty to correct a five months'
statement. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,004 (D. Colo.
1971).
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For example, by the time the question arises, 195 the data may
be stale and therefore may not require additional disclosure. If an
acquiring company issues a release indicating its plans to merge
and, subsequently, liquidate a large segment of the acquired com-
pany, but then cancels the merger and reports to a financial news-
paper news of this cancellation, there can be no duty to correct the
statement concerning liquidation: most investors will have access
to the information, while additional disclosure would be costly.
However, one may expect that, generally, forward-looking soft
data will have a continuing vitality and a longer self-life than hard
data. Thus, the hard datum of 1977 earnings need not be up-
dated, 196 but a projection for 1978 may require current revisions
until 1978 final data are published.
97
Of course, if a stranger on whom the market has no reason to
rely prepares a projection, the issuer will not endorse its contents
and, perhaps, ought not to respond to it.198 But if an analyst be-
comes associated with the issuer in the minds of the public, that
analyst's projection may carry sufficient credibility to require at
least disaffirmance by the issuer. 199
The SEC's official position on correction of projections has
not been consistent. Beginning with a requirement of periodic re-
vision, it shifted to a policy of compelling revision only when a
reasonable basis for the projection no longer existed; and now the
SEC merely requires management to inform investors that no
more updated projections will be furnished.2°°
The permutations and combinations of factual circumstances
which might raise a duty to correct, update, or disaffirm are many,
195. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 184-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see note 197
infra.
196. Correction may be required if the data were incorrect when revealed. Fischer
v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
197. In one case, correction was required even after the actual data were pub-
lished. Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842, 843
(2d Cir. 1970).
Even if not required, regular updating will minimize the risk of liability. Cf.
Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 678-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), ajfdper curiam, 464
F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding program of periodic updating with respect to esti-
mates and prospects was not misleading).
198. Commentators are split on this issue, and the cases are inconclusive. See 5 A.
JACOBS, supra note 171, § 88.04.
199. Fear has sometimes been expressed that, in this circumstance, if a duty to
correct is imposed on the issuer, it will be forced to publish projections. See id. §
88.04(b). However, it would seem that disavowal of the analyst's projection would
usually be sufficient. Cf. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 16 (2d Cir. 1977)
(disclaimer that the company could not predict its prospects and could not verify or
refute analyst's predictions was sufficient to avoid liability).
200. Sec. Act Release No. 5581, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,167; Sec. Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 80,461; 2 BROMBERG, supra note 66, § 6.11(523).
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and the cases few, to date.20' But it should suffice to note that we
may expect the problems to be more difficult when the items of
information invoking the question of duty are soft data.
SUMMARY
Information about the firm is the basis for fundamental anal-
ysis of its securities by investors who attempt to determine the
risks and returns from investment in individual securities. Among
the most relevant, but least reliable, data is soft information,
which, until recently, had been kept beyond the pale of formal
disclosure in SEC filings, largely because of unreliability.
The Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, in large
part because it believes disclosure should be for sophisticates, ap-
plauded the SEC's recent moves to permit voluntary disclosure of
more soft information and made some recommendations for its
further encouragement. The Committee proposed specific sugges-
tions to encourage voluntary disclosure of projections and more
meaningful statements in managements' analyses of earnings. It
also proposed permissive, voluntary disclosure of dividend and
capital structure policy and plans and objectives for firms.
The Committee thereby refused to reject not only fundamen-
tal analysis but also the unrelated attacks of SEC critics who be-
lieve that formal disclosure in SEC documents is of no utility,
largely because all the information thereby disclosed has long
before become public knowledge. Without satisfactorily resolving
these questions concerning whether SEC mandated disclosure is
worth its costs, the Committee, in my view, properly refused to
adopt the critics' views on the basis that they have not yet carried
their burden of persuasion.
Managers, thus having volition to publish or not publish such
items as projections and appraisals, will, among other things, be
concerned with potential liabilities for both disclosure and non-
disclosure "of soft information.
They will not be able to urge successfully that soft informa-
tion is not a "fact," subject to misrepresentation, but will be safe
from liability for statements which are made in good faith with a
reasonable basis, and which are adequately qualified. Moreover,
it will often be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that his reliance on
unreliable soft data was justified.
Although the removal of the ban on soft information disclo-
sure does not of itself mandate disclosure, it does eliminate an
excuse for non-disclosure, thus permitting operation of affirmative
duties to disclose under rule lOb-5. However, the very softness of
201. See 2 BROMBERG, supra note 66, §§ 6.11(510)-(560).
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soft data will provide some defense for non-disclosure on the basis
of lack of ripeness. Techniques for determining lack of ripeness
that will aid those charged with the duty to disclose are now being
formulated. Among the most appealling are the process of bal-
ancing relevance against reliability and the suggestion that only
data which will have an impact on market price should be consid-
ered material. A slightly greater danger exists for insider trading
without disclosure of soft information; because of the high degree
of relevance of soft information to investors, and because of its
abundance, an insider who trades has substantial exposure to a
claim that some undisclosed soft datum is material and should be
disclosed. Lack of ripeness is a less sure defense here. At the
same time, if the insider does disclose, because of the unreliability
of soft date, he risks a charge of misrepresentation.
Perhaps because soft data will often not eventuate, the great-
est dangers will arise when soft information is published and then,
when the facts do not materialize, it is claimed that the issuer or its
managers failed in their duties to correct, update or disaffirm the
previously published inaccuracy.
For both hard and soft data, difficult problems remain: the
extent to which the "half-truth" concept should be applied when
only one of two or more unrelated data is published; the duty to
supply background data; and the viability of the mosaic theory
which seeks to justify tipping of "immaterial" data that, in con-
junction with other data already known to the tippee, become ma-
terial. These problems, most difficult with respect to soft
information, await sound judicial, legislative, and executive expli-
cation.
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